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Issues of cross-cultural similarities and differences have been prominent in the
psychology of emotions for more than a century. Theories and measures of
culture and emotion tend to vary substantially from one study to another,
making the assessment of cross-cultural variation often more a matter of
paradigmatic presumptions than of empirical evidence. This is reflected in the
dichotomy between universalism and cultural relativism of emotions that is still
dominant in current discussions of'culture and emotion.
Recently, developments in both cross-cultural psychology and in emotion
psychology have opened possibilities of moving beyond this dichotomy. In
cross-cultural psychology, methods have been developed that provide a basis
for the assessment of cross-cultural similarities and differences on various levels
of equivalence (i.e., cross-cultural comparability). In addition, in emotion
psychology emerging conceptions of emotions as multicomponential
phenomena have made it possible to study cross-cultural similarities and
differences in various aspects of emotions. Together, these developments allow
for a more refined assessment of where and how emotions are similar or
different across cultures, without reverting to a universalism-relativism
dichotomy.
This thesis attempts to contribute to our understanding of cultural variation
in emotions through empirical, cross-cultural studies of various emotion
components at different levels of equivalence. The present chapter addresses
issues in cross-cultural psychology and emotion psychology that are relevant to
these studies. In addition, the research strategy that was followed in this thesis is
described. Finally, an overview is given of the empirical chapters presented in
this thesis.
Cross-Cultural Psychology
Psychologists like to find significant differences. The identification of
differences in psychological processes (e.g., cognitions or emotions) is the main
conceptual tool that psychology uses to explain variation in human behavior.
This is reflected in a preference for using experimental designs. In the light of
this emphasis it is not surprising that psychologists doing cross-cultural studies
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tend to focus primarily on cultural variations in behavior. More specifically,
they like to find significant differences across cultures. However, there are
several problems with the interpretation of differences in empirical cross-
cultural data.
A first problem lies in the fact that experimental designs can hardly ever be
followed in culture-comparative research. Cross-cultural research is quasi-
experimental (Cook 8z Campbell, 1979) because respondents cannot be assigned
at random to cultural conditions; every person is a member of a culture and
cannot be assigned to another culture. In addition, cultures differ on many
characteristics (e.g., GNP, level and rype of education, acquiescence; see Van
Hemert, 2003). It is usually unclear which specific cultural difference between
samples lies behind differences in the data.
A second problem is the likelihood of bias in the data (Van de Vijver 8z
Leung, 1997), which can lead to statistically significant differences even in the
absence of differences on the psychological trait that is the target of analysis
(Malpass 8z Poortinga, 1986). Bias can be found at different levels, ranging
from the psychological constructs as a whole to individual items in an
instrument (Van de Vijver 8z Tanzer, 1998).
A third complication arises from the absence of well-defined theories about
where and how culture affects psychological processes. Culture is an ill-defined
construct in psychology (see Soudijn, Hutschemaekers, 8i Van de Vijver, 1990),
making clear theoretical predictions of cross-cultural differences in
psychological processes difficult. In many cross-cultural studies, the invocation
of culture to explain empirical differences is post hoc and unsubstantiated
(Poortinga, 1992). In other cases, very broad distinctions between populations
(e.g., individualism and collectivism; Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1988) are used
to explain observed differences in such a wide range of variables that
interpretations become unspecific and do not refer to well-defined
psychological processes. Concepts of culture in psychology are often derived
from ideas in sociallcultural anthropology and ethnography. A problem is that in
these sciences culture is seen as inherently interwoven with psychological
processes, and that studies are meaning-centered and interpretative (see Jahoda,
1982). This is difficult to reconcile with an experimental cross-cultural
psychology that treats culture as an independent variable explaining
psychological differences (see Segall, 1984). As a consequence, some cultural
psychologists have argued that empirical and comparative methods should be
abandoned because they impose a Western view of psychological reality upon




The use of quasi-experimental designs, the possibility of bias, and the
absence of precise theories of cultural differences together make that empirical
differences between samples from different cultural backgrounds are relatively
easy to find, but difficult to interpret (Berry, Poortinga, Segall, 8z Dasen, 2002).
As a result, interpretation of data in terms of cultural differences in
psychological processes often remains dependent upon the assumptions
preferred by the researchers who conduct a study (see Eckensberger, 1979;
Reese 8c Overton, 1970). Basic consensus about the criteria for interpreting
cross-cultural data seems essential for the study of culture in psychology.
Therefore, the main problem in cross-cultural psychology is not finding
empirical differences, but rather establishing a basis for the interpretation of
such differences.
The logic of testing for differences requires that a standard of comparison is
shared between cultures, and hence that the psychological constructs under
study are cross-culturally identical. Any meaningful comparison becomes
impossible if such constructs are seen as essentially different
(incommensurable) between cultures (e.g., Kvale, 1992). Van de Vijver and
Leung (1997) have distinguished three levels of equivalence that identify to
what extent psychological data are comparable across cultures. When the
condition of construct or structural equivalence is satisfied, the same
psychological construct is measured across cultures, but not necessarily on the
same quantitative scale. With metric or measurement unit equivalence, the same
construct is measured on a scale with identical metric, but not necessarily with
the same scalar origin. Finally, with scalar or full-score equivalence, the same
construct is measured on an identical ratio scale. The level of equivalence
defines the basis of cross-cultural comparisons and as such qualifies the
interpretation of cultural differences.
According to Van de Vijver and Leung (1997), equivalence is not an
intrinsic property of a measurement, but rather dependent on the type of
interpretation of the scores and on the cultural groups examined. This implies
that equivalence of ineasures used for cross-cultural comparisons should be
empirically established rather than presumed. This thesis deals with the
empirical assessment of such cross-cultural (in)equivalence in the domain of
emotions.
Culture and Emotions
In the domain of emotion psychology, the issues in cross-cultural comparisons
that have been discussed in the previous section are particularly important. This
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is because claims of cultural variation in emotions range from extreme
universalism to extreme cultural relativism, and because emotions are complex
psychological constructs for which cross-cultural identity of indicators is not
agreed upon.
Although culture-comparative studies of emotion date back at least as far as
Darwin's (1872I1998) seminal treatise on the expression of emotions in man and
animals, the field today still seems to be dominated by the dichotomy between
universalism and relativism (Manstead óc Fischer, 2002). This is surprising
because the existence of both cross-cultural similarities and differences seems to
be acknowledged by scholars advocating more universalist positions (e.g., Eibl-
Eibesfeldt, 1980; Ekman, 1992; Scherer 8c Wallbott, 1994) as well as by
scholars supporting more relativist positions (e.g., Averill, 1980; Mesquita 8z
Walker, 2002; Levy, 1984). In addition, reviews (Mesquita 8z Frijda, 1992;
Mesquita, Frijda, 8t Scherer, 1997), meta-analyses (Van Hemert, Poortinga, 8c
Van de Vijver, 2003), and extensive empirical studies (Scherer 8z Wallbott,
1994) of emotions all report evidence for both similarities and differences.
However, in the interpretation of their results many researchers tend to fall back
to one side, either emphasizing the similarities as evidence that emotions are
basically universal or emphasizing the observed differences as evidence that
emotions are culturally constructed (Ellsworth, 1994). This tendency causes
discussions about emotion and culture to be dominated by strong claims that
distinct emotions are either products of phylogenetic development (Ekman,
1992) and have arisen as specialized adaptive programs in the human species
(Tooby 8z Cosmide~s, 1990), or that they are socially and culturally constituted
phenomena (Kitayama 8~ Markus, 1994) that are anything but natural (Lutz,
1988). In view of the empirical evidence, this polarized discussion on cultural
variation in emotions appears to be counterproductive (Manstead 8c Fischer,
2002 ).
Mesquita and Frijda (1992) have argued that the most important question in
cross-cultural studies of emotion is not the existence of cross-cultural
difterences in emotions, but instead to what extent and on what level such
differences can be found. In terms of the distinction between levels of
equivalence that was mentioned before, these can be seen as two separate
questions. Emotion constructs can be the same on a structural level (e.g., in their
relations to facial expressions, Matsumoto, 2001), but this does not exclude
substantial quantitative differences across cultures (e.g., in the frequency with
which the emotions are experienced; Markus 8z Kitayama, 2001). However, in
many empirical studies quantitative differences in scores are interpreted as
indicative of qualitative differences
8
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Paradoxically, claims of extensive cultural differences in emotions come
both from scholars who deny that there is any valid basis for cross-cultural
comparisons (e.g., Lutz 8z White, 1986), and from scholars who assume full-
score equivalence by interpreting differences in scores directly in terms of
cultural differences. For example, Mesquita (2001) interpreted statistically
significant differences in mean ratings of emotion components between a Dutch
sample on the one hand, and Surinamese-Dutch and Turkish-Dutch migrant
samples on the other, in terms of fundamental (i.e., qualitative) differences in
emotional experiences between individualists and collectivists. Conversely,
findings of structural equivalence of basic emotions in terms of associated facial
expressions (e.g., Ekman, 1992, 1994) do not necessarily imply universality in a
quantitative sense. Strong claims of encompassing universalism of basic
emotions often elicit resistance in more relativist scholars (e.g., Averill, 1994;
Harré, 1986).
The influence of non-emotion related sources of variance in quasi-
experimental designs makes that exclusive testing for significant differences is
likely to lead to an overestimation of cross-cultural differences. Therefore, it has
been proposed that relative effect sizes are more informative about the extent of
cross-cultural variation than statistical levels of significance (Matsumoto,
Grissom, 8z Dinnel, 2001; Scherer 8c Wallbott, 1994). Effect sizes can be seen
as indicators of the generalizabilty of cross-cultural differences (see Van de
Vijver 8c Poortinga, 1982), but do not contribute to resolving problems of bias.
Several sources of bias in cross-cultural emotions research have been
identified, providing plausible alternative interpretations of observed
differences. Most obvious is item bias due to imprecise translation of emotion
words (e.g., translating joy with "happiness" in one sample and with "elation"
in another sample), which may lead to cross-cultural differences in intensity
ratings that are not due to cultural differences in the target emotion. This is an
illustration of how bias can augment observed differences.
Some relativist scholars have argued that bias can also lead to an
overestimation of cross-cultural similarities in emotions (e.g., Lutz 8z White,
1986). Most criticism of culture-comparative studies pertains to method bias,
including factors such as sampling and measurement method. Many studies of
emotion use student samples, which is argued to have led to an overestimation
of cross-cultural similarities because such samples share similar, Western
notions and habits (Hupka, Zaleski, Otto, Reidl, 8z Tarabrina, 1996). Reviews
(e.g., Russell, 1994) and meta-analyses (e.g., Van Hemert et al., 2003) indicate
that studies of emotions with nonstudent samples from nonwestern societies
indeed show more cross-cultural variation. However, it is a matter of debate
whether bias has led to an overestimation of similarities with student samples or
9
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to an overestimation of differences with other samples. Another point of debate
concerns the measures that are used to compare emotions in cross-cultural
studies. For example, there has been a discussion on the way in which the
forced-choice method used in facial recognition studies may have led to an
overestimation of the universality of emotions (see Ekman, 1994; Russell,
1994).
Underlying such discussions are different notions about the nature of
emotion processes and about the measures that are most suited to study cross-
cultural differences. If emotions are seen as being reflected primarily by facial
expressions (e.g., Tomkins, 1980), then cross-cultural similarities in facial
expressions can easily lead to claims that emotions are cross-culturally similar
(e.g., Ekman, 1992). If the essence of emotions is seen to reside in their
symbolic meaning, then culture-specific connotations of emotion words can
easily lead to claims of incomparability across cultures (e.g., Shweder 8z Haidt,
2000). This would imply that it is impossible to tínd standards for cross-cultural
comparisons of emotions. To resolve such issues, researchers conducting
culture-comparative studies need to provide evidence showing the equivalence
of their data, and the appropriateness of their measures of emotion.
The most straightforward measures of emotions are emotion terms. Words
are often used in cross-cultural studies both as stimuli and as responses, but
there is no perfect mapping of emotion words among languages (see Russell,
1991; Wierzbiecka, 1992). Some relativist scholars see differences in the
emotion lexicon as indicators of cultural differences in emotional experiences
(e.g., Heelas, 1986; Wierzbicka, 1998), but many culture-comparative scholars
do not endorse this view, arguing instead that the relationship between emotion
processes and verbal labels is imperfect (e.g., Ekman, 1994; Scherer 8z
Wallbott, 1994). In either case, emotion words cannot serve as a cross-culturally
shared standard for the comparison of emotion processes.
Frijda, Markam, Sato, and Wiers (1995) have suggested that, instead of
emotion words, emotion components can be used for cross-cultural studies.
These components are derived from emotion theories in which multiple
determinacy of emotions is stressed (e.g., Frijda, 1986; Scherer, 1984).
Emotions are argued to consist of several processes of human psychological
functioning (i.e., components), which are relatively independent of each other.
The componential view holds that there is no single valid indicator of the
emotion process. In cross-cultural studies of emotions, some components have
been used frequently (e.g., appraisals; Mauro, Sato, 8z Tucker, 1992; Roseman,
Dhawan, Rettek, Naidu, 8L Thapa, 1995; Scherer, 1997), while others have
remained relatively underexplored (e.g., action tendencies; Redford, 1999). In a
review of the emotion literature, Mesquita, Frijda, and Scherer (1997) reported
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evidence for cross-cultural similarities and differences in each of various
emotion components. The componential approach allows that some emotion
components may be cross-culturally similar and some different, enabling a more
balanced assessment of the extent of cultural differences.
Research Strategy
In this thesis, four cross-cultural studies are presented that use emotion
components as multiple indicators of emotion experiences. These studies are
aimed at the assessment of equivalence and at finding standards for further
cross-cultural comparisons. This goal is pursued by using designs that allow for
the emergence of both cross-cultural similarities and differences, and that seek
to avoid Western impositions. Important features of such designs are the
selection of samples from a broad range of cultural and educational
backgrounds, and the construction of instruments with emotional situations
collected in each of the separate cultural populations (see Fontaine, Poortinga,
Setiadi, 8z Markam, 2002).
Any culture-comparative study assumes at least minimal identity
(commensurability) of psychological processes solicited by the procedures and
instruments that are employed. ln this thesis the working assumption is that
emotional experiences can be compared cross-culturally, but cross-cultural
equivalence of the relevant data is treated as an empirical question. If no
structural equivalence is found, this means that there is no identity of emotions
across cultures and that any further comparisons are meaningless. However, if
structural equivalence is found, even in studies with a high a priori probability
of finding cultural differences, then this indicates a basic cross-cultural identity
of emotions that can be used as a background for further comparative analysis.
This thesis departs from a perspective of psychological universalism (Berry
et al., 2002; Poortinga 8z Soudijn, 2002), which means that basic emotion
processes are expected to be found across cultures, but that there can be
differences in the cultural manifestations. Differences may be found at
structural level (e.g., in the association of an emotion with specific emotion
components) or at other levels of equivalence (e.g., in the experienced intensity
of emotions). This form of universalism does not imply that emotion processes
are identical across cultures, but a basic similarity in emotions (i.e., a core of
associated emotion components) is expected in so far as they reflect important
psychological processes underlying human behavior. Therefore, it is expected
that even in studies minimizing the imposition of Western emotion conceptions,




Three of the four studies presented in this thesis focus on differences between
the emotions shame and guilt. These emotions were chosen because they belong
to the category of social emotions that cannot be identified on the basis of a
clear facial expression like the basic emotions (see Izard, 1977). Hence,
indicators of these emotions in cross-cultural research have to rely on self-
reported experiences, complicating the assessment of cross-cultural
equivalence. Moreover, in view of their social nature (see Tangney 8z Fischer,
1995) shame and guilt have been argued to be especially prone to cultural
variation (Kitayama 8c Markus, 1994). Thus, these emotions provide a strict test
for psychological universalism.
In current emotion psychology, the distinction between shame and guilt has
become an important topic (e.g., Tangney, 1995, 1996). Though much of the
literature focuses on individual differences in shame-proneness and guilt-
proneness as personality characteristics (for an overview see Tangney 8c
Dearing, 2002), several studies have addressed distinct characteristics of shame
and guilt as emotion processes (e.g., Frijda, Kuipers, 8z Ter Schure, 1989;
Keltner 8i Buswell, 1996; Manstead 8i Tetlock, 1989; Roseman, Antoniou, 8z
Jose, 1996; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, 8z Barlow, 1996). There are different
theoretical perspectives on shame and guilt. One conception focuses on the
locus of sanction (e.g., Parsons 8z Shils, 1952), which originates in the public
exposure of one's failures in shame and in a private disapproval of failing to live
up to one's moral standards in guilt. Another conception focuses on the locus of
negative affect (Lewis, 1971), which pertains to the whole self in shame and to
a specific behavior or act in guilt.
The empirical evidence for distinct emotion characteristics is generally
compatible with both conceptions, and recent studies have suggested that
morality and exposure, as well as different self-experiences are important in
distinguishing shame and guilt (e.g., Fontaine et al., 2003; Smith, Webster,
Parrott, 8c Eyre, 2002). In this thesis, an empirical approach is taken to the
distinction between shame and guilt (see Wallbott 8~ Scherer, 1995); the various
emotion components that have been reported in the emotion literature are used
as multiple indicators of these emotions in the culture-comparative studies.
Reports of cultural differences in shame and guilt have a long and
fragmented history. Perhaps most widely known is the distinction between
shame cultures and guilt cultures by Ruth Benedict (1946). She used these terms
to describe what she saw as important differences between Japan (shame
culture) and the USA (guilt culture) in the social regulation of moral behavior
(Creighton, 1990). The distinction was interpreted by other scholars in terms of
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categorical differences in emotional experiences, implying that in a shame
culture there is emotion of guilt (e.g., Mead, 1964). However, such
interpretations were disputed (Ausubel, 1955; Piers 8z Singer, 1971), and more
moderate views have become dominant in which cultural differences are argued
to reside in the degree or emphasis on either shame or guilt (Grinder 8c
MeMichael, 1963; MeMichael 8z Grinder, 1966; Sabini 8c Silver, 1997).
Related to the notion of shame-cultures and guilt-cultures is the currently
popular distinction between individualist and collectivist cuhures (Triandis,
1988). However, predictions from this theory about cultural differences in
shame and guilt have been contradictory. Triandis (1995) has argued that
collectivists experience more shame, whereas Eid and Diener (2001) have
argued that collectivists focus more on guilt. Wallbott and Scherer (1995) found
that shame and guilt were more distinct emotions in samples from collectivist
societies than from individualist societies. This finding concurs with reports that
the two emotions are confounded in Western culture (Scheff, 1995), and more
clearly defined in Asian cultures (e.g., Marsella, Murray, 8z Golden, 1974;
Retzinger, 1995).
Cultural differences in the frequency, intensity, or distinctness of shame and
guilt do not imply that these emotions are structurally different across cultures.
Cross-cultural similarities have been reported in ratings of shame and guilt
across situations (Hashimoto 8z Shimizu, 1988; Johnson et al., 1987), as well as
in characteristic experiences across various emotion components (Fontaine et
al., 2003; Hong 8z Chiu, 1992). All in all, these findings suggest that structural
equivalence of shame and guilt across cultures can be expected.
Overview of the Chapters'
Chapter 2 addresses cross-cultural similarities and differences in the association
of body sensations with emotions. Findings of cross-cultural similarities in this
area have been disputed by scholars who argue that studies with non-student
samples from widely different cultural backgrounds show larger cross-cultural
~ The studies reported in each chapter were conducted in collaboration with ~~arious colleagues
(Zara Ambadar, Roxana Espinoza, Johnny Fontaine, Patrick Luyten, Pierre Philippot, Ype H.
Poortinga, Bernadette Setiadi, Jesus Vaca, Priyo Widiyanto). The text of the chapters is in part
based on the manuscripts that were written about these studies.
Chapter 2 was based on: Breugelmans, S. M., Poortinga, Y. H., Ambadar, Z., Setiadi, B., Vaca, J.
B., Widiyanto, P., á Philippot, P. (2004). Bocw Sensations Associated with Emotions in Rarcímtn~i
Indians, ruralJavanese, and Three Studenr Samples. Manuscript submitted for publication.
All the other chapters were based on manuscripts in preparation.
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differences. In this chapter a study is presented of the association of twelve
body sensations with seven emotions in samples of Rarámuri Indians from
northern Mexico and of rural Javanese from Indonesia with low exposure to
Western, industrialized culture, in addition to three student samples. Both
parametric and non-parametric analyses were used to assess general cultural
variation, and to identify specific cultural differences in cross-culturally shared
profiles.
In Chapter 3 two studies are presented that assess cross-cultural similarities
and differences in the emotions shame and guilt at different levels of
equivalence. In Study 1, a large set of situations was rated by Indonesian and
Dutch students on the extent to which these would elicit shame and guilt. In
Study 2, strong shame eliciting or guilt eliciting situations were selected from
Study 1, and rated on 47 emotion characteristics (appraisals, self-experiences,
action tendencies, body sensations, rumination, social sharing, and emotion
words) by students from Belgium, Indonesia, Mexico, and the Netherlands. In
both studies, cross-cultural variation in shame, guilt, and associated emotion
components was assessed both on structural and on quantitative levels of
equivalence.
In Chapter 4 the assessment of structural equivalence of shame and guilt is
extended to Rarámuri Indians, who lack an emotion term for guilt, and to rural
Javanese from Indonesia. Two studies addressed the question to what extent
findings obtained with student samples (Chapter 3) could be generalized to non-
student samples and to samples lacking a lexical distinction between shame and
guilt. In Study 1, a range of situations eliciting shame were collected from the
Rarámuri and the Javanese, and situations eliciting guilt were collected from the
Javanese only. These situations were rated by Dutch and Indonesian students on
the extent to which these would elicit shame and guilt. In Study 2, strong
shame-eliciting and guilt-eliciting situations were selected from Study 1 and
rated on 31 emotion characteristics (appraisals, self-experiences, action
tendencies, body sensations, rumination, social sharing, and emotion words) by
Rarámuri and Javanese. The structure of shame and guilt characteristics of both
rural samples was compared with the structure obtained with students (Chapter
3).
In Chapter 5 cross-cultural similarities and differences in experiences of
shame and of guilt were studied in samples from Indonesia, Mexico, and the
Netherlands. It was tested whether the findings obtained with ratings of
preselected situations in previous studies (Chapter 3) could be replicated using
ratings of self-reported situations on 41 emotion characteristics (appraisals, self-
experiences, action tendencies, body sensations, rumination, social sharing, and
emotion words). Both the extent of cross-cultural variation in the emotíon
14
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ratings and the distinct association of emotion components with either shame or
guilt were assessed.
Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes the most important findings and discusses
their implications for psychological universality in shame and guilt.
15
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Body sensations associated with emotions in Rarámuri
Indian~, rtlr~l 1~~~ al~csc. and threc ~tudcnt samples
People are said to be red with anger and to have weak knees during fear. Bodily
metaphors are so common to emotion talk (see Kóvecses, 2000) that many
people will find it difticult to imagine emotions without any bodily sensation at
all. Early scholars in psychology posited the experience of body sensations to be
the defining component of emotional experience (e.g., James, 1884), but
challenges to the physiological differentiation of emotions (Schachter 8L Singer,
1962; Valins, 1972) and the physiological origin of experienced body sensations
(Rimé, Philippot, 8~ Cisamolo, 1990) have led to a diminished importance of
this component in contemporary emotion theory. Both the general importance
(e.g., Averill, 1974) and the specific characteristics (e.g., Ameka, 2002) of
bodily metaphors of emotions have been argued to be culturally variable
constructions, rather than reflecting intrinsic physiological changes. So, in some
cultures people may be said to feel their intestines boiling with anger
(Kwecses, 2000) and their liver jumping with fright (Lutz, 1988).
In the emotion literature, physiological activation and experienced body
sensations are often taken as a single component (see Mesquita 8t Frijda, 1992),
but the empirical evidence for emotion differentiation in each of these two
domains is markedly divergent. With respect to physiological activation, some
researchers (e.g., Levenson, Ekman, 8z Friesen 1990) have claimed unique
profiles of autonomic nervous system activation for several of the basic
emotions defined by Ekman (1992), while others have concluded there is no
empirical evidence for such claims (Boiten, 1996; Zajonc 8z McIntosh, 1992).
In contrast, with experienced body sensations findings have consistently pointed
to differentiation between emotions, across individuals and methods (for a
review see Rimé et al., 1990). Proponents of a psychobiological interpretation
(e.g., Scherer, 1992) see these body sensations as a reflection of underlying
physiological changes "signing" the emotion. The contrast between the two
domains may be due to difficulties in studying physiological concomitants of
emotions (see Cacioppo 8z Tassinary, 1990; Stemmler, Heldmann, Pauls, 8c
Scherer, 2001), but an alternative explanation is that there is no direct link
between physiological events and body sensations.
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In a constructivist view (e.g., Averill, 1974; Hupka, Zaleski, Otto, Reidl, 8~
Tarabrina, 1996) body sensations come about because they are expected to
occur as part of emotion processes; they are part of cognitive schemata about
physiological events associated with emotions (Philippot 8z Rimé, 1997). Rimé
et al. (1990) found that schematic stereotypes about bodily concomitants of
emotions closely matched the sensations typically reported to be felt during
emotional episodes. Combining this with empirical evidence to the effect that
performances of untrained people fluctuate around chance level when trying to
detect physiological changes in their bodies (see Katkin, 1985; Pennebaker,
1982), Rimé et al. argued that a link between body sensations and such changes
is unlikely. ln addition, reports of cultural variation in emotions and body
concomitants (see Mesquita 8z Frijda, 1992; Russell, 1991) as well as
anthropological accounts of culture-specific constellations of emotional
experiences (e.g., Lutz, 1988) support the notion of body sensations as a
culturally constructed emotion component. In this view, body sensations
experienced with emotions are not generalizable across cultures because this
component is not intrinsic to emotion processes (Averill, 1974).
Results from extensive culture-comparative studies, however, are
incompatible with the notion that relationships between body sensations and
emotions are only a matter of cultural construction. The differentiation of body
sensations across emotions was found to show strong similarities across cultures
(e.g., Scherer, Summerfield, 8z Wallbott, 1983; Scherer 8z Wallbott, 1994;
Scherer, Wallbott, 8i Summerfield, 1986), contrary to what would be expected
if body sensations were culturally constructed phenomena. Although cross-
cultural similarity does not provide direct evidence of links between body
sensations and physiological events, it does suggest that body sensations are a
universal and distinct emotion component. This means that the range of cultural
variation in the conceptualization of body sensations with emotions is
constrained by universal characteristics of the emotion process (see Kóvecses,
2000; Poortinga, 1992).
In response, some constructivist scholars (e.g., Hupka et al., 1996; Rimé et
al., 1990) have argued that previous cross-cultural studies may have
underestimated cultural variation due to a number of inethodological
limitations. Philippot and Rimé (1997) suggested that differences may have
been curtailed due to (a) the use of open answer questionnaires, leading to
restrictions in the number of body sensations thought of by participants, (b) the
limitation of studies to mainly Western-European countries or student samples,
and (c) the aggregation of body sensation items into broad categories. Philippot
and Rimé argued that "before drawing any definite conclusion in this domain,
non-college students, and rural populations should be compared in markedly
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different cultures" (p. 184). In the light of cultural variation in the use and
meaning of emotion concepts (e.g., Ameka, 2002; Lutz, 1988; Russell, 1991), it
is expected from a constructivist view that the range of cultural variation in
body sensations as concomitants of emotion processes is much larger than
previous studies have suggested.
The different expectations regarding cultural variation in body sensations
relate to the broader debate of cultural variation in emotions. This debate has
been characterized by opposing claims of pan-human universality (e.g., Ekman,
1992) and cultural relativity (e.g., Lutz, 1988) of emotions, and disagreement in
the interpretation of empirical data in favor of either position (see Ekman, 1994;
Russell, 1994). The tendency to capitalize either on cross-cultural similarities or
on cultural differences in the interpretation of empirical data has led to
conceptualizations of emotions as either universal or culture relative phenomena
(see Manstead 8c Fischer, 2002). In attempts to go beyond this apparent
dichotomy, researchers have proposed to see universality-culture relativity as a
continuum, indicating the degree to which psychological phenomena can be
generalized across cultures (Van de Vijver 8z Poortinga, 1982). Empirical
assessments of the extent of variation in the emotion domain (e.g., Scherer 8z
Wallbott, 1994; Van Hemert, Poortinga 8z Van de Vijver, 2003) suggest that
there exists some valid (i.e., not caused by measurement bias) cultural variation
in emotions. Several emotion components seem to have at least a core of
features that can be generalized across cultures (see Mesquita 8t Frijda, 1992).
If strong cross-cultural similarities are replicated in studies meeting the
methodological improvements mentioned by Philippot and Rimé (1997), then
this would suggest that body sensations are an intrinsic component of emotions
with high generalizability across cultures.
The present study addresses the range of cultural variation in body
sensations with emotions across Rarámuri Indians, rural Javanese, and student
samples from Belgium, Indonesia, and Mexico. Closed answer questionnaires
were used, including seven emotions and twelve body sensations, including
sensations used in previous studies (Scherer 8z Wallbott, 1994) as well as new
sensations suggested by pretest in the different cultures considered, and
extending the range of cultural variation to populations with very limited
exposure to Western, industrialized life-style. These methodological extensions
should increase the probability of finding larger cultural variation in
experienced body sensations with emotions, allowing for better estimation of
the generalizability of the findings from previous studies on this topic.
Estimates of the extent of cultural variation are complicated by the quasi-
experimental design of culture-comparative studies and the possibility of bias
(Poortinga 8z Malpass, 1986; Van de Vijver 8z Leung, 1997). This makes the
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interpretation of statistically significant differences as reflecting substantial
cultural differences debatable (see Matsumoto, Grissom, 8c Dinnel, 2001).
Some scholars in cross-cultural studies of emotion (e.g., Scherer 8z Wallbott,
1994; Wallbott 8z Scherer, 1988) primarily look at estimates of effect size. This
does not resolve any problems of bias, but avoids capitalizing on relatively
unimportant effects. For the mapping of the relationship between body
sensations and emotions in various cultures, analyses at an ordinal level (e.g.,
Rimé 8z Giovanni; 1986; Rimé et al., 1990) can be insightful because possible
biases related to general score levels (e.g., response styles or dífferences in
emotion intensity) are avoided. In the present study, analyses at both interval
and ordinal levels of ineasurement were performed. Culture-specific findings
are discussed against the background of cross-culturally similar associations
between body sensations and emotions.
In summary, the present study (i) examines the extent of cross-cultural
variations in body sensations associated with emotions among samples from
highly divergent cultures, (ii) maps differences between emotions in




Five samples were included in this study: urban student samples from
universities in Belgium, Indonesia and Mexico, and rural samples with little or
no formal education from villages in Central Java (Indonesia) and Northern
Mexico. Of the 450 participants in the study, seven with more than 2.So~o
missing values were excluded from further analysis. For the other participants,
missing values (in total 0.090~0 of the scores) were replaced by the item mean of
the sample. In total, 443 participants were included in the analyses.
The Belgian student sample consisted of 75 undergraduate students (41
female, 34 male) from the University of Louvain in Louvain-la-Neuve, with a
mean age of 20.31 years (SD - 1.93). All were native French speakers. The
Indonesian student sample consisted of 85 undergraduate students (60 female,
25 male) from Universitas Indonesia in Jakarta, with a mean age of 20.29 years
(SD - 3.50). All students were fluent speakers of `Bahasa Indonesia,'
Indonesia's national language. The Mexican student sample consisted of 123
undergraduate students (83 female, 40 male) from the Escuela Libre de
Psicología A.C. in Chihuahua, with a mean age of 24.46 years (SD - 8.20). All
were native Spanish speakers.
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The Mexican rural sample consisted of 61 Rarámuri ( Tarahumara) Indians
(24 female, 37 male) with a mean age of 51.70 years (SD - 14.57), as indicated
by the participants themselves. All were native speakers of (at least one of) the
Rarámuri variants and had received little or no formal education. All
participants resided in or traveled around the community of Guachochi in the
central highlands of the Sierra Tarahumara. The Rarámuri are a native Indian
group of Uto-Nahua or Uto-Aztec decent, living in the Sierra Madre mountains
in the Mexican state of Chihuahua. They form the largest indigenous group in
Northern Mexico with an estimated population of between 60,000 and 80,000.
Traditionally, individual families live dispersed over the available land and no
substantial agglomerations of indigenous households are found. Subsistence is
mainly through small-scale agriculture, with cultivation of crops such as maize
and beans. Historically, the Rarámuri are known for their strong resistance to
Spanish and later Mexican cultural influences (see Levi, 1998). Western media
have been brought to Rarámuri territory, but most of the population still has
very little contact with these. For purposes of this study, participants were
selected who spoke little or no Spanish to minimize influences by Mestizo
cultural diffusion.
The Indonesian rural sample consisted of 99 Javanese farmers ( 49 male, 50
female) with a mean age of 46.18 years (SD - 14.63). All were native speakers
of Javanese, living in various small farming communities in the central south
region of Java. Although the tropical climate and fertile volcanic soil may yield
three or even four harvests of rice each year, most farmers are poor due to low
crop prices and limited land ownership. For this study, traditional communities
were selected where manual agricultural labor was the most common source of
income, buildings were constructed mainly of wood and bamboo, and a
sewerage system, tap water, and sometimes even electricity were absent.
Because of the relative isolation of these communities and the low level of
education (870~0 of the participants had not finished primary school), exposure to
Western media was very limited.
Instrumeot
The instrument consisted of seven emotion vignettes (joy, anger, fear, sadness,
disgust, surprise, and shame) each accompanied by a list of twelve body
sensations (lump in the throat, breathing changes, stomach sensations, feeling
hot, feeling warm, feeling cold, heart beats faster, sweating, goose-flesh,
blushing, feeling weak in the knees, and feeling hot in the eye). An emotion was
identified both by an emotion word (e.g., joy) and by a vignette, giving an
example of a situation in which the emotion may typically be experienced (e.g.,
"What do you feel in your body when you experience joy, for example when a
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good friend has come to visit you?"). The example was added to reduce effects
of possible semantic differences in emotion words. With the two Mexican
samples, vignettes were composed of the example used in the other groups plus
an additional one (e.g., "What do you feel in your body when you experience
joy, for example when a good friend has come to visit you or when you are at a
very nice party?"). This was done for purposes of additional clarification to
reduce possible translation bias into Rarámuri.
The list of body sensations was based on a list originally developed by
Wallbott and Scherer (1988) and adapted by Philippot (1991). A sensation
reported in a pilot study with Indonesian participants, namely hot in the eve, and
a sensation spontaneously reported in both Belgium and Indonesia, namely
goose-flesh were added to Philippot's questionnaire. The item tense mzrscles was
removed because no translation into Rarámuri could be found without a major
connotation of physical illness. Each item had a 6-point Likert scale ranging
from I do not feel this bodv sensation at all (0) to 1 f'eel fhis bodv sensation very
strongly (5). Scores indicate the intensity with which participants reported
experiencing a body sensation with an emotion.
For each of the translations into Bahasa Indonesia, Spanish, and Javanese
several local bilinguals were involved using a committee approach (Van de
Vijver 8z Leung, 1997). Translation into Rarámuri was done by two bilinguals,
using a back-translation method. Cross-checking was done in field-interviews.
Procedure
Participants were requested to take part in a study concerning sensations that
people feel in their body during emotions. Belgian students were approached in
different libraries on the university campus and asked to complete the
questionnaire under supervision of the researcher. Indonesian and Mexican
students completed the questionnaire during a lecture period. All students
participated voluntarily and were not paid.
Rural Javanese and Rarámuri were approached in their communities by
trained local interviewers. The Indonesian interviewers were undergraduate
students from Sanata Dharma University in Yogyakarta experienced with
interviewing. The interviewers were fluent in Javanese and originated from the
area where the interviews were administered. After an initial training, trial
interviews were held, followed by evaluation by the researchers. Participants
were interviewed individually in their homes or on the farmlands. Participation
was voluntary and each participant was paid 12,500 Indonesian rupiah (by local
standards a generous reward for the time spent). The Rarámuri interviewer
originated from the Guachochi area and was fluent in the local variations of the
Rarámuri language. He had experience interviewing local inhabitants for several
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governmental institutions and was trained and tested in several trial interviews
for the present study. Participants were interviewed in their homes, on their
lands, or on the road while traveling. They cooperated voluntarily and were not
paid individually since this was not appropriate by local standards. Instead,
maize was bought and given to the local community for a celebration.
Results
Extent Of Cross-Cultural Variation
The extent of cross-cultural variation in the data was examined using a
multivariate variance components analysis, with the factors culture (5), emotion
(7), body sensation (12), and their interactions, in addition to the factor
individual (443). The model explained 4~0~0 of the variance, with individuals
(1 10~0) and the emotion x body sensation interaction (120~0) explaining more than
the emotion x culture interaction (20~0), or the culture x emotion x body
sensation interaction (So~o). Thus, individual consistency and differentiation of
body sensations across emotions were more important in explaining the
variance in the data than interaction components involving emotion and culture.
This suggests limited cultural variation in the differentiation of body sensations
between emotions. The remaining effects were relatively small as well. Overall
differences in general intensity level were as follows: between cultures (20~0),
emotions (2oro) and body sensations (70~0). The body sensation x culture
interaction (40~0) suggested limited differences between cultures in the average
intensity of body sensations across emotions.
Separate Repeated Measures Analyses (see Table A 1 in the Appendix) per
body sensation, with culture (5) as a between-subjects factor and emotion (7) as
a within-subjects factor also showed limited cultural variation for each separate
body sensation. Table 1 displays the estimated effect sizes (partial rlZ) of the
main effects and interactions for each body sensation. Multivariate main effects
and the interactions were significant in all instances, but the mean effect size of
the interactions across body sensations (M [riz] -.14, SD [rl'`] -.04) was
markedly lower than the mean size of the main effects of emotion (M [rlZ] -.56,
SD [riz] -.12). The largest cultural differences in differentiation of body
sensations across emotions were found in weak in the knees and feeling cold,
but even for these the main effects of emotion (rl~ -.54 and rlZ -.46,
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These results are similar to those obtained by Scherer and Wallbott (1994)
who analyzed aggregated body sensations of student samples from 37 countries.
They concluded that such results indicated pronounced differentiation of body
sensations between emotions and only limited cross-cultural variation. In this
context, main effects for culture are difficult to interpret since they may signify
differences between cultures in the general intensity with which body sensations
are experienced across emotions, but may also reflect differences in scale use,
for example due to response tendencies (Van de Vijver 8c Leung, 1997; Van
Herk, 2000).
Body Sensation Profiles Across Emotions
Emotion-specific profiles of body sensations were explored by examining the
rank order of inean intensity ratings of body sensations for each emotion in each
culture (see Rimé et al., 1990). Examination at ordinal level facilitates the
search for emotion-specificity of body sensations across cultures because
possible biases related to general score level (e.g., response styles) and emotions
(e.g., differences in overall intensity between emotion words) are avoided. The
rank orders of body sensations in Table 2 were computed by averaging the
emotion-specific rank orders of all five samples (see Table A2 in the
Appendix). Unfortunately, there are no clear criteria given in the literature when
to consider a body sensation "rypical" for an emotion. Somewhat arbitrarily the
top 250~0 (i.e., an average rank order 5 3) of body sensations was taken to be
primarily associated with each emotion, while the others are deemed less
typicaL Table 2 also includes in superscripts the most salient cultural deviations
from the average rank order. The most salient "positive" deviations are given in
superscript with a plats sign, indicating that a non-primary body sensation
belonged to the top 250~0 (i.e., with a cultural rank order 5 3) in a particular
culture. The most salient "negative" deviations are given in superscript with a
minus sign, indicating that one of the primary body sensations belonged to the
bottom SOo~o (i.e., with a cultural rank order ~ 6) in a particular culture. These
deviations give a first impression of emotion-specific association of body
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BODY SENSATIONS ASSOCIATED 11'ITH EMOTIONS
The protïles in Table 2 suggest that emotions are associated with different
body sensations. Every emotion except anger and surpr-ise is associated with at
least one sensation that is not primarily associated with other emotions. On the
other hand, some body sensations are highly associated with several emotions
(e.g., heart beats faster, and hreathing changes). [n order to estimate the degree
of distinctness of body sensation protíles for the various emotions, rank order
correlations ( Spearman's p) between body sensation protíles were calculated.
These showed that, generally, correlations between emotions were low (median
p-.36). The protíle ofszrrprise (median p-.56, ranging from -. 07 to .81) was
least distinct from that of other emotions and the profile of disgust ( median p-
.04, ranging from -. 30 to .69) most. The fact that the profiles of some emotions
are related should not be surprising given the documented similarities between
emotions on other dimensions of affect (see Russell, Lewicka, 8r Niit, 1989).
However, for the purpose of this study, the profiles seem sufficiently distinct to
consider each of the seven emotions as separate.
Cultural Deviations
For the generalizability of the findings, and the interpretation of cultural
deviations of the study it is important to know to what extent they are similar to
Scherer and Wallbott's (1994) study with students from 37 countries. For a
comparison rank orders were calculated per emotion on the percentages of body
sensations reported in Scherer and Wallbott (Table 8, p. 321). Only the body
sensations and emotions shared by both studies were included (i.e., lump in the
throat, breathing changes, stomach sensations, feeling cold, feeling til~arm,
feeling hoJ, heart beats faster, sweating, and joy, anger, fear, sadness, disgust,
shame). The resulting rank order correlations were all very high and significant
(N - 8; p ~ .OS), ranging from .99 in anger, .95 in fear, .91 in sadness, .90 in
joy, .83 in sharne, to .74 in disgust. Correlations of the average rank orders of
only the rural samples with Scherer and Wallbott's results were lower, but still
significant (N - 8; p ~ .OS), ranging trom .92 in anger-, .83 in fear and in joy, .81
in sadness, .60 in disgust, to .59 in shame. This strongly suggests that the
common emotion profiles found in this study show high generalizability across
studies and samples, providing a firm basis for the identification of cultural
deviations.
The unequal distribution of salient deviations in Table 2 suggested that
some emotions show more cross-cultural variation, and that some samples are
less similar to the average patterns than others. Rank order correlations were
calculated per emotion for each culture with the average association pattern.
Table 3 confirms the impression that the convergence between cultures across
emotions is substantial; the correlations were generally high. Three exceptions
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were the lower congruence of the Rarámuri for anger (p - .55) and sadness (p -
.57), and of the Javanese for surprise (p - .37). These two samples also showed
a slightly lower mean congruence across emotions. This suggests that Philippot
and Rimé's (1997) assertion is valid that the inclusion of non-Western, non-
student samples increases cultural variation. However, considering the
likelihood of bias effects (e.g., in translation, test administration, interviewers,
etc.) the similarities remain notable. The mean correlations in Table 3 can be
seen as indices of the generalizability of the body sensation profiles that are
displayed in Table 2. This means that, based on the samples in this study, the
pattern of,~ear (mean p-.90) tends to be more culturally stable than that of, for
example, surprise (mean p - .68).
The design of the study did not allow for clear tests as to whether the
specific deviations in body sensation profiles in Table 2 should be seen as bias
(i.e., method artifacts) or as valid culture-speciiíc patterns, hence any
interpretation requires caution. Inspection of the culture-specific rank orders of
body sensations (see Table A2) suggested some salient deviations across
emotions, while others are emotion specific. This has implications for the
interpretation, as can be illustrated with the following examples of highly
deviant items'. First, the positive deviation of weak in the knees with the
Rarámuri in joy, anger, surprise, and shame seemed to be the result of a general
emphasis or prominence of this body sensation across emotions. Cultural
salience of weak in the knees is plausible given the traditional life context and
cultural focus on the condition of the legs in Rarámuri culture. Running and
long-distance stamina are traditionally highly valued among the Rarámuri, who
are renowned for their abilíty in long-distance racing (sometimes more than 100
km cross-country; e.g., Bennett 8i Zingg, 1935; Kennedy, 1978).
Second, the negative deviation of lump in the throat with the Rarámuri in
sadness is much more difficult to interpret in cultural terms. Inspection of the
culture-specific rank order of this body sensation showed lump in the throat to
score low on all emotions, even on those where other cultures scored higher
(e.g., sadness, disgust). This may mean that the body sensation is absent or at
least not elaborated upon in Rarámuri culture (cultural hypocognizing; Levy,
1984), but it is also possible that the translation of the item into Rarámuri was
not equivalent.
~ Highly deviant items were identitied by the difference (absolute) between the culture-specific
rank and the average rank, averaged across emotions. Weak i~~ rhe knees with the Rarámuri was
the most deviant body sensation across cultures ( mean deviation - 4.03), lump in the thi~oa~ with
the Rarámuri was the second most deviant ( mean deviation - 3.33), and goose-Jle.rh with the
Javanese was the fifth most deviant ( mean deviation - 1.97).
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Table 3
Correlations ISpearrnan 's p) per Emotion of Cu(tura( Rank Orders of Boc~y
Sensutions With the Average Rank Order in Table 2
Samples
Students Non-students
Emotions Indonesian Belgian Mexican Rarámuri Javanese Mean p
Body Sensations (N- 12)
Joy .79~~` .95~`~` .87~`~` .67~` .87~`~` .83
Anger .86~~` .98~`~` .93~`~ .55 .96~`~` .86
Fear .98~~` .90~`~` .94~`~` .82~`~` .86~`~` .90
Sadness .92~`~ .76~`~` .71 ~`~` .57 .82~`~` .76
Disgust .94~~` 92~`~` .89~`~` .60~` .92~`~` .85
Surprise .67~ .91 ~`~` .70~` .74~`~` .37 .68
Shame .94~`~` .86~`~` .85~`~ .80~`~` .84~`~` .86
Mean p .87 .90 .84 .68 .81
~`p ~ .05. ~` ~`p ~ .01.
Third, the positive deviation ofgoose-flesh with the rural Javanese infear
and surprise is likely to be the result of a culture-specific association.
Translation inequivalence or other method artifacts are an unlikely
explanation; the rural Javanese use of goose-flesh with other emotions, and
the use of other body sensations with, fear and surprise corresponded to the
association patterns found for the other samples. The typical experience of
gouse-flesh (merind(ng) in traditional Javanese culture when seeing a ghost or
spirit, an experience also strongly associated with fear and startle, can provide
a plausible account.
Discussion
The main aim of the present study was to examine the extent of cross-cultural
variation in body sensations associated with emotions when non-Western, non-
student samples are included in culture comparative research. Contrary to what
would be expected if body sensations were a socially constructed emotion
component, both parametric and non-parametric analyses pointed to limited
cultural variation in the data. Replication of the results of Scherer and Walbott's
(1994) study with two rural samples from opposite sides of the globe suggests
cross-cultural generalizability of body sensation protiles with emotions.
Rural samples contributed more to cultural variation than the student
samples, although this effect was limited (see also Van Hemert et al., 2002).
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This supports the need for the inclusion of such samples in order to improve the
validity of cross-cultural studies (Hupka et al., 1996; Philippot 8~ Rimé, 1997).
In addition to the estimates of global cultural variation used in previous
research, the study explicitly focused on the identification of culture-specitic
deviations against the background of culturally similar profiles. The most
salient deviations were observed for weak in the knees with the Rarámuri, and
for the association between goose-flesh and,fear with the Javanese. Overall it
can be concluded that the methodological improvements suggested by Rimé et
aL (1990) increased cultural variation, but that body sensation profiles with
emotions still showed high generalizability across cultures. This finding has
implications for both emotion theory and cross-cultural psychology.
Emotion theory has seen a gradual decrease of the emphasis on bodily
aspects of affective experience, from James' (1884) peripheral emotion theory
to the emphasis of cognitive determinants of experienced arousal in emotions
(Valins, 1972). Like previous studies on body sensations (e.g., Rimé 8i
Giovanni, 1986; Scherer, Summerfield, 8c Wallbott, 1983; Scherer 8~ Wallbott,
1994), the results indicate that these are associated with emotions in a similar
way across cultures, strongly suggesting that body sensations are an important
component of emotional experience. The replicable differentiation of body
sensations across emotions indicates their relevance for contemporary emotion
theory, next to more established components such as appraisals, facial
expressions, and action tendencies (Mesquita óc Frijda, 1992).
The finding of substantial cross-cultural similarities limits explanations
regarding the origin of experienced body sensations to psychological functions
that are themselves cross-culturally similar. The most obvious candidate is
universal emotion physiology, but ambiguous findings in the current empirical
record on physiological differentiation (see Levenson et al., 1990; Zajonc 8L
McIntosh, 1992) and self-perception of physiological processes (see Rimé et al.,
1990) make this explanation imprecise, and hence problematic. The alternative
explanation of cognitive construction of bodily concomitants of emotions (see
Philippot 8t Rimé, 1997) cannot be ruled out, but would mean that such
construction occurs in a very similar way across cultures, which is implausible.
A third explanation could be found in the embodied memory of emotional
experiences (see Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, 8z Ruppert, in press); that is,
body sensations are an intrinsic part of the cognitive representation of emotional
experiences. This links the experience of physiological concomitants of
emotions to the cognitive construction of emotional experiences, possibly
explaining why retrospective experiences and stereotypic representations of
bodily emotions concomitants are very much alike. Such a relationship could
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also explain why bodily metaphors and metonyms are prominent elements of
emotion talk in cultures around the globe (K6vecses, 2000).
For cross-cultural psychology, body sensations do not only provide an
accessible entry for the comparison of affective experience across cultures
(LeVine, 1973), but also an illustration of the need to consider simultaneously
cultural invariance and variations in studying psychological phenomena. Many
contemporary cross-cultural studies seem to take the position that differences
between groups are culturally meaningful unless these have been proven to be
artifacts (Matsumoto et al., 2001). A combined culture-specitic and culture
comparative approach, identifying cultural specificity with reference to a
common standard, leads to a more precise search for cultural differences
(Fontaine, Poortinga, Setiadi, 8c Markam, 2002). Rather than focusing on the
universality-relativity dichotomy (see Manstead 8z Fischer, 2002), cultural
differences should be seen as variations within the boundaries imposed by
universal psychological processes (Poortinga 8t Soudijn, 2002).
Thus, in this study the correlations of cultural profiles with the average
profile (Table 3) reflect an estimate of the range of cultural variation. The
tentative interpretation of salient cultural deviations from this pattern (see Table
2) show how one can begin to make sense of such variation. Estimation of the
range of variation is an empirical question and likely to become more refined
when specific cultural deviations are identified as bias or culturally meaningful
specificities. The culturally shared body sensation profiles may lead to the
identification of more culture-specific deviations in future studies. Conversely,
the investigation of cultural deviations in emotions, for example sarrprise with
the Javanese or anger with the Rarámuri, may lead to more accurate estimates
of cross-cultural generalizability of body sensation profiles. As such, detailed
studies of culture-specific body sensations with emotions (e.g., Ameka, 2002)
are complementary to global studies of the range of cultural variations in broad
bodily categories (e.g., Scherer 8z Wallbott, 1994) with emotions, since both
answer a different part of the same question.
In conclusion, there seems to be truth in James' (1884) claim of a central
place for body sensations in shaping emotional experience. People from cultures
around the world report embodied feelings of emotions. Although their exact
feelings may vary, this variation is bounded by universal aspects of emotional
experience; there are limits to the cultural definition of emotion. Anger will
always be a"hotter" emotion than fear, whether this is felt in blood rushing to
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Appendix
Table A1
Effects ofC'ulttrre and Emotion in Repeated Measures Analvses of Tta~elve Body
Sensations
Between-subjects Within-subjects
Culture Emotion Emotion ~ Culture
Body Sensation MS~,,.,~,,.a F~ Wilks' F` Wilks' Fd
Lambda Lambda
Lump in the Throat 4.89 57.27 0.42 98.78 O.SS 1 1.67
Breathing Changes 4.70 30.94 O.S I 70.27 O.S7 10.87
Stomach Sensations S.9S 67.O1 0.48 79.SS 0.65 8.21
Feeling Cold 4.44 16.39 O.S4 62.38 0.42 17.57
Feeling Warm 1.77 16.23 0.24 223.28 0.62 9.33
Feeling Hot 4.04 28.71 0.32 152.32 0.6 10.18
Heart Beats Faster 4.92 27.13 0.24 235.48 0.47 15.17
Sweating 5.87 13.84 0.44 90.76 0.61 9.59
Goose-flesh 4.27 34.12 O.S6 57.80 O.S 1 13.50
Blushing 4.38 34.87 0.32 152.42 O.S2 12.95
Weak in the Knees 5.46 15.17 0.46 84.20 0.38 20. I 1
Hot in the Eye 4.77 17.95 O.S7 53.96 0.63 9.03
Note. All effects are significant (p ~ .001).
' d.f-..,,, - 438
~df- 4
` hypothesis df- 6; error df- 433




Rank Or-ders of Body Sensations per- Emotion for the Five Samples
Samples
Students Non-students
Body Sensations Indonesian Mexican Belgian Rarámuri Javanese
Joy
Lump in the Throat 5 8 10 10 12
Breathing Changes 3 5 5 6 2
Stomach Sensations 9 6 4 I 1 7
Feeling Cold 1 1 10 11 4 9
Feeling Warm 1 2 2 1 1
Feeling Hot 6 3 3 5 5
Heart Beats Faster 2 1 1 2 3
Sweating 7 7 7 7 4
Goose-flesh 10 12 8 12 10
Blushing 4 4 6 8 6
Weak in the Knees 12 9 9 3 1 1
Hot in the Eye 8 1 1 12 9 8
Anger
Lump in the Throat 3 4 5 9 5
Breathing Changes 2 2 2 3 3
Stomach Sensations 9 7 3 8 7
Feeling Cold 6 9 10 5 9
Feeling Warm 12 12 12 12 12
Feeling Hot 4 3 4 4 2
Heart Beats Faster 1 1 1 1 1
Sweating 8 6 6 6 8
Goose-flesh 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Blushing 7 5 7 10 4
Weak in the Knees 10 8 8 2 10
Hot in the Eye 5 10 9 7 6
34




Body Sensations Indonesian Mexican Belgian Rarámuri Javanese
Fear
Lump in the Throat 7 6 8 9 8
Breathing Changes 2 2 2 5 4
Stomach Sensations 8 3 3 7 7
Feeling Cold 4 7 6 3 3
Feeling Warm 12 12 l2 12 12
Feeling Hot 9 9 9 4 9
Heart Beats Faster 1 I 1 1 1
Sweating 5 4 4 6 5
Goose-flesh 6 8 7 10 2
Blushing 1 1 10 11 1 1 11
Weak in the Knees 3 5 5 2 6
Hot in the Eye 10 1 I 10 8 l0
Sadness
Lump in the Throat 1 1 1 8 5
Breathing Changes 2 5 4 4 4
Stomach Sensations 7 2 3 9 10
Feeling Cold 5 3 5 3 2
Feeling Warm 12 12 8 12 l2
Feeling Hot 10 9 10 2 7
Heart Beats Faster 6 6 6 1 3
Sweating 8 8 7 6 8
Goose-t7esh 9 7 11 10 11
Blushing 11 10 12 11 9
Weak in the Knees 3 4 9 7 1






Body Sensations Indonesian Mexican Belgian Rarámuri Javanese
Disgust
Lump in the Throat 4 4 6 1 1 2
Breathing Changes 1 5 4 3 4
Stomach Sensations 2 1 1 1 1
Feeling Cold 7 3 2 6 5
Feeling Warm 12 12 12 12 12
Feeling Hot 11 ] 0 ] 0 5 10
Heart Beats Faster 5 6 5 2 6
Sweating 8 8 8 8 8
Goose-flesh 3 2 3 9 3
Blushing 10 9 9 10 11
Weak in the Knees 6 7 1 1 4 7
Hot in the Eye 9 11 7 7 9
Surprise
Lump in the Throat 4 9 7 1 1 7
Breathing Changes 3 2 2 3 2
Stomach Sensations 8 7 3 9 8
Feeling Cold 11 12 9 4 4
Feeling Warm 2 4 11 7 10
Feeling Hot 6 3 5 5 9
Heart Beats Faster 1 1 1 1 1
Sweating 9 6 6 6 5
Goose-flesh 12 10 8 12 3
Blushing 5 5 4 8 I1
Weak in the Knees 7 8 10 2 6
Hot in the Eye 10 11 12 ] 0 12
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Body Sensations Indonesian Mexican Belgian Rarámuri Javanese
Shame
Lump in the Throat 5 4 7 10 8
Breathing Changes 7 6 6 6 9
Stomach Sensations 10 7 5 9 6
Feeling Cold 8 9 9 4 2
Feeling Warm 12 12 l2 12 12
Feeling Hot 3 3 3 3 3
Heart Beats Faster 1 2 2 1 1
Sweating 4 5 4 S 4
Goose-flesh 1 1 10 ] 0 11 11
Blushing 2 1 1 7 5
Weak in the Knees 6 8 8 2 10
Hot in the Eye 9 11 11 8 7
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Assessing (non)identity of shame and guilt across
cultures
In his novel called Shame, writer Salman Rushdie (1983) explained to his
readers that the English emotion term shame cannot adequately render the
emotion sharam that is central to his story. He argued that the meaning of
sharam is much broader than the meaning of the English shame. To
psychologists, such accounts of cultural differences in emotion terms prompt
the question to what extent emotion processes underlying these terms are also
culturally variable. Emotion scholars stand divided on this issue. Some contend
that differences in word meaning indicate differences in emotional experiences
(e.g., Menon 8z Shweder, 1994), but others argue that there is no perfect match
between emotion words and emotion processes (e.g., Frijda, Markam, Sato, 8z
Wiers, 1995), implying that there can be cross-cultural similarities in emotions
even when terms are different (Ekman, 1994).
In spite of encompassing reviews (Mesquita 8z Frijda, 1992, Mesquita,
Frijda, 8z Scherer, 1997), meta-analyses (Van Hemert, Poortinga, 8z Van de
Vijver, 2003), and empirical culture-comparative studies (Scherer 8z Wallbott,
] 994) that all indicate the existence of both cross-cultural similarities and
differences in emotions, much of cross-cultural psychology still seems
dominated by a dichotomy between universalism and cultural relativism of
emotions. One reason that has been given for the persistence of this dichotomy
is the absence of precise theories of where and how cultures differ in emotions
(see Mesquita, 2001). Alternatively, it can also be argued that the theoretical
lacuna is due to an inadequate empirical record, making it unclear where and
how cultural differences in emotions can be expected. This is aggravated by
lack of consensus on the interpretation of empirical findings of such differences
(e.g., Ekman, 1994; Russell, 1994). Empirical clarity on cross-cultural variation
in emotions is needed before any cultural theory of such differences can be
formulated.
This chapter presents two empirical studies on shame and guilt that are
meant to contribute to a more precise delineation of where cultures are similar
and where they are different in these emotions. Shame and guilt were chosen
because the empirical basis for the (non-)identity of these two social emotions is
less clear than for the basic emotions that can be identified on the basis of facial
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expressions (for a review see Matsumoto, 2001). Social emotions lack such
distinet markers (see Izard, 1977). On the one hand, the importance ascribed to
shame and guilt in current emotion psychology (e.g., Tangney 8z Dearing, 2002)
suggests that these will be found in all cultures. On the other hand, the social
nature of shame and guilt (see Kitayama 8z Markus, 1994; Tangney 8z Fischer,
1995) points to substantial cultural variation in these emotions.
Claims of cultural variation in shame and guilt have been fueled by the
well-known distinction between shame-cultures and guilt-cultures by Ruth
Benedict (1946). Benedict used this to describe differences in the regulation of
moral behavior between Japan and the U.S.A., but she was unclear in indicating
exactly where and how differences in shame and guilt should be found. Some
scholars interpreted the distinction as categorical, implying that in shame
cultures there is no room for an emotion of guilt (Mead, 1964), but such
positions could not be maintained (see Ausubel, ] 955; Piers 8z Singer, 1971).
Others argued that differences should be found in the degree or emphasis on
shame or on guilt (Sabini 8z Silver, 1997), resulting in lower guilt after
transgression in shame cultures (Grinder 8z McMichael, 1963; McMichael óc
Grinder, 1966). However, these claims have also been disputed. For example,
Lebra (1983) has argued that Japanese are especially prone to experiences of
guilt, in contrast with their designation as a shame-culture.
Still, the distinction has been argued to be useful because it is related to
differences in cultural values (Creighton, 1990), notably the distinction between
individualist and collectivist cultures (Triandis, 1988). Individualism and
collectivism (Hofstede, 1980) have enjoyed much popularity in the past decades
in explaining cultural differences. However, the exact meaning of these
concepts as cultural characteristics is not entirely clear (e.g., Berry, Poortinga,
Segall, 8z Dasen, 2002; Oyserman, Coon, 8~ Kemmelmeier, 2002). Predictions
of cultural differences in shame and guilt have been contradictory. Triandis
(1995) has argued that collectivists experience more shame, whereas Eid and
Diener (2001) have argued that collectivists focus more on guilt.
Parallel to theoretical unclarity, empirical studies have reported cultural
similarities and differences in a variety of characteristics. For example, cross-
cultural differences have been reported on the intensity and frequency of shame
and guilt experiences (e.g., Ha, 1995), the distinctness of these emotions (e.g.,
Marsella, Murray, 8z Golden, 1974; Retzinger, 1995; Wallbott 8c Scherer,
1995), and the types of situations in which they occur (e.g., Liem, 1997; Marcus
8t Kitayama, 1991; Stipek, 1995 ). Accounts range from broad statements that
shame and guilt are cultural emotions par excellence (Lutz, 1988), to very
specific findings that these emotions are closer to fear and further from anger in
Indonesia than in the Netherlands (Fontaine, Poortinga, Setiadi, 8~ Markam,
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2002). Cultural similarities have also been reported, for example in ratings
across situations (Hashimoto 8z Shimizu, 1988; Johnson et al., 1987), and in
characteristics of emotional experiences (Fontaine et al., 2003; Hong 8~ Chiu,
1992). All in all, these varied findings in empirical studies illustrate the
divergence in approaches to the assessment of cross-cultural (non)identity of
shame and guilt.
A major problem in assessing cultural variation is the absence of consensus
on how to interpret the results of empirical studies. In experimental psychology
it is common practice to test for statistically significant differences in scores
between conditions. Many cross-cultural scholars follow the same procedure in
culture-comparative studies, assuming that scores obtained from different
cultural samples are directly comparable (i.e., they meet the psychometric
condition of full-score equivalence, see Van de Vijver ác Leung, 1997).
However, this assumption is questionable given the quasi-experimental nature
of cross-cultural research. Cultural samples vary on numerous characteristics
and there is a high likelihood of bias in data (see Berry et al., 2002). This makes
the straightforward interpretations of differences in mean scores between
samples in terms fundamental cultural differences in emotions (e.g., Mesquita,
2001) questionable. The large a priori possibility of tinding such differences,
even in the absence of differences in the underlying psychological trait (see
Poortinga 8z Malpass, 1986), makes testing for significant differences a poor
strategy for estimating cultural variation.
In various extensive cross-cultural studies on emotions, Scherer and
Wallbott (1994; Scherer, 1997; Wallbott 8~ Scherer, 1988) have proposed that
the interpretation of relative effect sizes is more informative about the extent of
cultural variation (see also Matsumoto, Grissom, 8z Dinnel, 2001). Effects
involving culture with relatively small effect sizes were taken to indicate only
limited cross-cultural differences. Effect sizes can be seen as indicating the
generalizability of cultural differences, but they do not resolve any problems of
bias in the data.
A further step in this direction can be taken by distinguishing between
various levels of equivalence of cross-cultural measurements. Van de Vijver áz
Leung (1997; see Poortinga 8c Van de Vijver, in press) have described three
levels of equivalence that are now quite common in culture-comparative
research. In the case of structural or functional equivalence, the same
psychological trait is measured, but not necessarily on the same quantitative
scale (cf. Celsius and Fahrenheit scales); in the case of inetric equivalence the
same trait is measured on the same quantitative scale, but not with the same
scalar origin (cf Celsius and Kelvin scales); in the case of scalar or full-score
equivalence the same trait is measured on the same ratio scale (cf. Celsius and
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Celsius). Van de Vijver and Leung have argued that equivalence of cross-
cultural measurements cannot be assumed and should be empirically established
for any level.
Two culture-comparative studies were conducted that assessed cultural
variation in shame and guilt at different levels of equivalence. The aim of these
studies was to generate empirical findings that may narrow down the range of
plausible viewpoints on universality or cultural relativity in emotions. Hence,
the focus in on the extent and level of cultural variation in shame and guilt
rather than on testing categorical claims of similarities or differences (see
Mesquita 8z Frijda, 1992). This required designs that allowed for the emergence
of both cross-cultural similarities and differences and that tried to avoid the
imposition of a priori categories upon de data (Fontaine et al., 2003; Russell,
1994). Important features of such designs are the selection of samples with
divergent cultural background, and the interpretation of differences against the
background of cross-culturally similarities (Fontaine, Poortinga, Setiadi, 8z
Markam, 2002). Study 1 focused on the ratings of shame and guilt across a wide
range of situations, and Study 2 focused on the association of various emotion
components with ratings of shame and guilt.
Three major types of cross-cultural differences were examined: (i) in the
experience of shame and guilt across situations (i.e., the factorial structure of
the constructs of "shame" and "guilt"), (ii) in the relations of each of these two
emotions with each other, with other emotions, and with various emotion
components (i.e., the correlations of shame and guilt with other constructs), and
(iii) in the relative intensity with which shame and guilt are experienced.
Studv 1
Introduction
This study addressed the question to what extent similar ratings of shame and
guilt would be obtained for a range of everyday situation between Indonesian
and Dutch students. These countries were chosen because they can be seen as
good representatives of the currently popular distinction between collectivist
and individualist societies (Hofstede, 1980, 2001), and because previous studies
between these samples allow for somewhat detailed expectations regarding
differences in shame and guilt (Fontaine et al., 2002; Heider, 1991).
Because lay people often have difficulties in distinguishing shame and guilt,
most assessments of these emotions make use of scenarios or situation
descriptions (Tangney, 1996). Caution is needed when using situations as
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stimuli because these may be interpreted differently across cultures, for example
because of specific cultural concerns (see Mesquita, Frijda, Bz Scherer, 1997;
Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, 8z Fischer, 2000). In the present study,
participants were presented with a wide range of situations that originated from
widely different regions, including both more proximate (i.e., Javanese for the
Indonesians, and Flemish Belgians for the Dutch) and more distant (i.e.,
Rarámuri from Mexico) cultures. Although this does not remove any effects of
cultural specitïcity in any separate situation, it should provide a better over-all
estimate of cultural variation in shame and guilt.
An objection that can be raised against the comparison of emotion ratings
across situations is that translations of emotion words in different languages do
not map perfectly (Wierzbiecka, 1992). This means that differences in ratings
need not so much indicate differences in the underlying emotion processes, but
rather reflect speciíïc connotations of words (e.g., the uniquely positive
connotation of "being aggressive" in the USA; Osgood, May, 8z Miron, 1975).
With the Indonesians and Dutch this may also be the case, as Fontaine et al.
(2002) found the linguistic equivalents of shame (i.e., n~alzr and schanmte) and
guilt (i.e., bersalah and schulc~ to be related differently to other emotions that
were found to be both linguistically and cognitively equivalent. In order to
avoid such difficulties, participants were asked to rate situations using
instruments in the English language. All participants were competent in the
English language. This approach should provide a stronger test of cultural
differences in shame and guilt than could be obtained with data collected with
translated instruments. If previously found differences would be replicated, then
this would strongly suggest that these were due to variation in the underlying
emotion processes and not to mere linguistic differences.
Three types of possible cross-cultural differences were examined:
1. Studies that compared shame and guilt ratings across situations have
reported that factorial structures of these ratings were similar among cultures
(Hashimoto 8c Shimizu, 1988; Johnson et al., 1987). This suggests that
structurally the emotions are equivalent. Hence, a first hypothesis was that the
factorial structures of both shame ratings and guilt ratings would be equivalent
between Indonesians and Dutch. It may be noted that lack of equivalence would
suggest that an emotion "shame" or "guilt" is not the same construct in both
cultures, rendering further comparisons meaningless (see Van de Vijver 8L
Leung, 1997).
2. A recurring claim regarding cultural differences in shame and guilt is that
these emotions are more distinct in Oriental, collectivist cultures than in
Western, individualist cultures (Marsella, Murray, 8z Golden, 1974; Retzinger,
1995; Wallbott 8z Scherer, 1995). In addition, Fontaine et aL (2002) found that
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shame and guilt were related more to fear and less to anger in Indonesia than in
the Netherlands (see also Heider, 1991). This led to the second hypothesis that
ratings of shame and guilt should be correlated stronger with each other in the
Netherlands than in Indonesia, and that ratings of each of these two emotions
should show higher correlations with anger, and lower correlations with fear in
the Netherlands than in Indonesia.
3. A third type of differences pertained to intensity levels of emotions.
Cross-cultural comparisons of ratings are particularly vulnerable to method bias
(Van de Vijver 8c Poortinga, 1997) that affects all items in a study (e.g.,
response styles or acquiescence), so full-score equivalence, which is required
for direct comparison of scores, can almost never be attained. Because of this,
only relative differences in emotion ratings (i.e., differences in the target
emotions after centering data on the cultural means of ratings on a larger
number of emotions) were addressed in the present study. As was already
mentioned, claims of cultural variation in emotion intensity levels are not
consistent, so predictions were difficult to make. According to some authors,
shame is experienced more intensely in collectivist~shame-cultures and guilt
more intensely in individualist~guilt cultures (Grinder c~ McMichael, 1963; Ha,
1995; Triandis, 1995), but according to others collectivists experience more
guilt (Eid 8z Diener, 2001; Lebra, 1983), or more shame as well as more guilt
(Bierbrauer, 1992). Two separate expectations seemed to best represent the
literature: (i) intensity ratings of shame should be relatively higher with
Indonesians than with the Dutch, and (ii) ratings of guilt should be higher with
Indonesians than with the Dutch.
Method
Participants
In the study participated 80 students enrolled in psychology at Tilburg
University in the Netherlands (61 female, 18 male, 1 missing) with a mean age
of 21.58 years (SD - 6.57), and 74 students enrolled in English language and
literature at Sanata Dharma University in lndonesia (52 female, 22 male) with a
mean age of 21.97 years (SD - 1.77). Before entering university, Dutch students
had received a minimum of 6 years of education on the English language. At
university, textbooks are frequently offered in English only and students are
expected to be able to follow lectures in English. Indonesian participants
followed a curriculum to become either a professional translator or a teacher of
English. Preliminary probing of the stimulus materials ascertained that
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participants in both samples had no difficulties with a questionnaire in the
English language.
Instrument
There were two versions of the instrument, each consisting of a questionnaire
with 105 short descriptions of situations, accompanied by a list of five emotions
(anger, guilt, sadness, shame, and fenr). Participants indicated the intensity with
which they would experience each of the emotions for each situation, using a 6-
point Likert-scale ranging from 0("I would not experience this emotion at all")
to 5("I would experience this emotion very strongly").
Two versions were used because participants could not rate 210 situations
without loss of accuracy due concentration problems or fatigue. Participants
were arbitrarily assigned to one of two versions of the questionnaire; in version
1 participated 40 Dutch students (31 female, 9 male) and 36 Indonesian students
(24 female, 12 male). In version 2 participated 40 Dutch students (30 female, 9
male, 1 missing) and 38 Indonesian students (28 female, 10 male).
The total set of 210 situations was composed of three sets of descriptions of
everyday shame and guilt episodes gathered in two other studies of shame and
guilt. Sixty-eight episodes were collected from Rarámuri Indians from Northern
Mexico, 102 episodes with rural Javanese from Indonesia (see Chapter 4), and
40 episodes were gathered with Flemish Belgian students (Fontaine et al.,
2003). Episodes in all three cultures were gathered with both female and male
informants. The sampling of situations across these very different populations
should make the total situation set more representative of the full range of
naturally occurring shame and guilt situations than scenarios drafted by
researchers or than situations gathered with a single population.
Situations were gathered in Indonesia and Mexico by local interviewers,
asking participants if they could shortly describe an episode in their life in
which they felt very much shame or guilt. Episodes were written down literally
by the interviewers and translated from Rarámuri~Spanish and
Javanese~Indonesian into English by several local bilinguals using a committee
approach (Van de Vijver 8c Leung, 1997). Situations in Belgium were collected
with a questionnaire asking participants to describe situations in which they
experienced strong feelings of shame or of guilt. Translation into English of the
Flemish situations was done using a back-translation approach. Descriptions of
episodes were culturally decentered if necessary (e.g., names of places or
specific animals were replaced by a generic term) and any sentences containing
reference to shame or guilt, and closely related terms, were deleted or, if
deletion would disturb the coherence of the description, replaced by a neutral
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substitute (e.g., upset). The resulting situational descriptions were divided
arbitrarily over the two versions of the questionnaire.
Procedure
Participants were requested to take part in a study about "emotional episodes as
described by people from different parts of the world". Participation was
voluntary and anonymous. Indonesian students were paid 7,500 Indonesian
rupiah (at the time of the study approximately 1 US dollar) and Dutch students
received credits for a course requirement. Indonesians completed questionnaires
during a lecture period and the Dutch completed questionnaires in a lecture
room reserved for the purpose of the study. Completing the questionnaire
usually took between 50 and 80 minutes.
Results
Before the analyses, missing values (0.080~0) in the data were replaced by the
group mean on the variable.
Structural similarities
Cross-cultural equivalence of shame and guilt ratings across situations was
examined through comparison between the two samples of the factor solutions
of shame ratings and of guilt ratings across the 105 situations in a version. In all
four data sets ( 2 samples by 2 versions) a single factor was extracted for shame
ratings ( explaining 200~o and 320~0 of variance) and for guilt ratings ( explaining
200~o and 270~0 of variance). Factorial agreement between samples was computed
using Tucker's phi, which is a measure of association of factor solutions. Values
above .90 can be seen as indicators of acceptable factorial similarity (Van de
Vijver 8z Leung, 1997). In version l, congruence was slightly below the
criterion value, both for shame ( phi -.88) and for guilt (phi -.85). Inspection
of factor loadings at item level showed that there were a few items with deviant
factor loadings. For shame two situations out of 105 were the major reason why
phi was lower than .90; exclusion of these items led to a phi of .90. With guilt,
exclusion of seven situations out of 105 produced a phi of .90. The nine deviant
situations originated from Javanese (N - 5; So~o of the situations), Belgians (N -
2; So~o of the situations), and Rarámuri (N - 2; 3o~0 of the situations), providing
no indication that cultural origin made a major contribution to inequivalence. [n
addition, no patterns could be found in the content of the inequivalent situations.
In version 2, congruence was acceptable in both shame (phi -.93) and guilt (phi
-.93), and no situations with clearly deviant factor loadings were observed.
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Thus, for 201 out of 210 situations in this study, structural equivalence was
found for both shame ratings and guilt ratings~.
Correlations among emotions
For the examination of correlations among the five emotions, a single situation
(210) x emotion (5) matrix was made per sample by combining the two versions
of the questionnaire, where cells represent the mean ratings of an emotion on a
situation. Because participants were distributed in an arbitrary manner between
versions, sub-samples can be considered equally representative of the combined
cultural sample.
Correlations between shame, guilt, and the other three emotions can be
found in Table 1. Shame and guilt are correlated differently in the two samples.
These two emotions are not significantly correlated with the Indonesians (r -
.04, ns), while there is a signiticant positive correlation with the Dutch (r -.38,
p ~ .001). The difference between these correlations is signitïcant (z --3.66, p
~.001), suggesting that shame and guilt are more distinct emotions in Indonesia
than in the Netherlands.
Table 1
Bivariate Correlations between Emotions for Indonesian and Dutch
Participants (Based on 210 Situations)
Emotion Shame Guilt Anger Fear Sadness
Shame -- .04 -.21 ~`~` .23~`~` -.19~`
Guilt .38~`~` -- -.49~`~` .41 ~`~ .29~`~`
Anger -.19~` -.16~` -- -.27~`~` .18~`
Fear .34~`~` .27~` .03 -- .03
Sadness .03 .16~` .55~`~` .15~` --
Note. Correlations above the diagonal were calculated for the Indonesian
participants and values below the diagonal were calculated for the Dutch
participants.
~` p ~ .05. ~`~` p ~ .001.
~ There are two ways to deal with deviant situations. First, these can be seen as disturbing the
cultural comparability of the shame and guilt ratings and be deleted for further analyses. This
would reduce cultural variation in the shame and guilt ratings. Second, they can be seen as
informative of cultural differences in shame and guilt and be included in further analyses. Given
the relatively small number ofdeviant items (in total 9 out of210), elimination of the situations
did not markedly affect the results of the correlations (r,~hamz K,,;;,, -.38 with .N - 201 in the
Netherlands and r,5ham~,E,,;n, -.03 with ,N - 201 in Indonesia) or ANOVAs (version l, repeated
measures ANOVA with culture [4 levels] as between-subjects factor and emotion [5 levels] and
situation [96 levels] as within-subjects factors produced similar results to those in Table 2, only tlz
-.30 for Situation and 11' -.37 for Emotion ~` Situation). Hence, it was decided to leave the
situations in the data set for further analyses.
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As can be seen in Table 1, the hypothesized cultural differences in
correlations of shame and guilt with the other emotions were not found. In both
samples, shame and guilt were positively correlated with fear (no significant
differences in correlations between samples, ps ~.OS) and negatively with anger
(guilt more so in Indonesia, z- 8.81, p ~.001). Also, correlations of shame and
sadness were signitícantly different between the two samples (z --2.26, p ~
.OS): in Indonesia these emotions were negatively correlated, but in the
Netherlands there was no signitícant correlation.
Relative differences in emotion intensities
Relative differences between samples in shame and guilt intensities were
examined with repeated measures ANOVAs for each version, with culture (2
levels) as a between-subjects factor and emotion ( 5 levels) and situation (105
levels) as within-subjects factors. Prior analyses including gender yielded only
very sma(I main effects and interaction effects (all rl' ~.03). Hence, in further
analyses gender was not included as a factor. Table 2 shows that results for the
two versions were very similar except for the main effect of culture, which was
significant in version 2, with Indonesians rating situations on average higher (M
- 2.40, SD - 0.70) than the Dutch (M- 2.03, SD - 0.55).
In both versions the main effect of emotion showed large effect sizes,
suggesting strong differences between emotions in average intensity ratings.
Pairwise comparisons of emotions (using Bonferroni adjustment for multiple
comparisons with a-.OS) showed shame to be rated significantly higher than
all other emotions. Guilt was second in average intensity. The higher ratings for
shame and guilt indicate that the manipulation ( selection of shame and guilt
situations) can be taken as successful.
The same patterns of differences were found in pairwise comparisons
(Bonferroni with a-.OS) within each version and culture. In both cultures
shcurze ( Indonesia: M- 3.13, SD - 0.63; Netherlands: M- 3.10, SD - 0.65) was
rated significantly higher than all other emotions. Guilt ( Indonesia: M- 2.77,
SD - 0.59; Netherlands: M- 2.39, SD - 0.58) was rated higher than sadness
(Indonesia: M- 2.42, SD - 0.86; Netherlands: M- 2.14, SD - 0.89), fear
(Indonesia: M- 2.01, SD - 0.75; Netherlands: M- 1.43, SD - 0.73), and unger
(Indonesia: M- 1.41, SD - 0.65; Netherlands: M- 1.67, SD - 0.82).
Prior to comparisons of shame and guilt ratings between cultures, ratings in
each version were centered on the sample mean (calculated over all five
emotions and 105 situations). One-sided t tests (Indonesians were expected to
be higher on shame and on guilt) indicated that there were no signitícant
differences in shame in version 1 of the instrument, t(74) - 0.60, ns, or version
2, t(76) - 1.66, ns. Guilt was also not different in version 2, t(76) - -0.48, ns,
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but signiticantly higher for the Indonesians (M - 2.75, SD - 0.61) than for the
Dutch (M - 2.47, SD - O.S l) in version l, t(74) - -2.18, p ~ .05. Calculation of
effect size using Cohen's d(Cohen, 1988)' indicated that the difference in guilt
was of moderate size (d - 0.50). Thus, in only one out of four instances were
relative differences between samples found in shame or guilt intensity.
Table 2
Repeated .Measures ANOt'As for Eaclz Version tivith Czrltzrre (2~ ns Bettiveen-Subjects
Factorand Emotrorc (S) and Srtcration (105) as Within-Subjects Factors
Version 1 Version 2
Source cJf F dj. F
Between-subjects
Culture ( C) 1 0.13 .00 1 6.61 ~` .08
Error (C) 73 (34.23) 76 (41.44)
W ithin-subjects
Emotion (E) 4 150.86~~` .65 4 172.91 ~`~` .66
E x C 4 9.78~`~ .04 4 12.77~~` .OS
Error(E) 292 (22.78) 304 (18.90)
Situation (S) 104 35.60~`~` .31 104 37.16~`~` .31
S x C 104 5.92~`~ .OS 104 6.21~`~` .OS
Error (S) 7592 (2.22) 7904 (2.54)
E x S 416 48.67~`~` .38 416 50.18~`~` .38
E x S x C 416 6.01 ~`~` .OS 416 5.85~`~` .04
Error (E x S) 30368 (1.38) 31616 (1.29)
Note. Values in parentheses are mean square errors.
~`p ~ .05. ~`"p ~ .01.
The main effect for situations in Table 2 indicated differences in mean
ratings between situations. Minor cultural variation in these ratings was
suggested by the relatively small effect sizes of the situation x culture
interaction. The large effect for the emotion x situation interactions indicated
that emotions were rated differentially across situations, and thus that some
situations more typically elicit certain emotions (e.g., shume or guilt) more than
others. The relatively small three-way interaction again suggested limited
cultural variation in this effect.




The high average ratings for guilt and shame are evidence that the situation
descriptions presented to the participants were indeed recognized as pertaining
to these emotions. In addition, it was found that the constructs of shame and
guilt were structurally equivalent across cultures. The nine situations out of 210
for which equivalence was doubtful can be of interest in a further inquiry of bias
or cultural differences, but the finding of evidence for equivalence of the
remaining 201 situations suggested that shame and guilt were largely equivalent
between Indonesians and Dutch. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact
that cultural origin of the situations did not have noticeable effects on the
equivalence of shame and guilt ratings.
Also in line with the expectations were the differences between Dutch and
Indonesians in correlations between shame and guilt ratings. The assertion that
shame and guilt are more distinct emotions in Asian~collectivist societies than in
Western~individualist societies (e.g., Marsella, Murray, 8z Golden, 1974;
Wallbott 8c Scherer, ]995) was supported; shame and guilt were not related in
Indonesia, but positively related in the Netherlands. This suggests that shame
and guilt may be more confounded experiences in the Western conception of
these emotions (Scheff, 1995). Given the structural equivalence in shame and
guilt ratings, this tínding is unlikely to be caused by differences between the
emotion constructs in the two samples. Contrary the expectations, no
differences were found in the relatedness of shame and guilt with other negative
emotions (see Fontaine et al., 2002; Heider, 1991).
Also contrary to expectations, relative differences in the intensity of shame
and guilt intensity were only found in one out of four tests. This means that
interpretation should be done with caution. The relatively higher rating of guilt
by the Indonesians in version 1 concords with suggestions by Eid and Diener
(2001) and Lebra (1983) that guilt is more salient in Asianlcollectivist societies,
but the absence of any difference in guilt in version 2 does not warrant an
explanation in terms of such broad cultural characteristics.
Studv 2
Introduction
The next step in the assessment of cultural variation in shame and guilt was to
look at emotion components associated with either shame or guilt.
Componential theories (e.g., Frijda, 1986) emphasize that emotional
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experiences consist of an array of characteristics in several emotion
components, such as appraisals, body sensations, and action tendencies. In
addition, reviews suggest that cultural variation in emotions can differ from one
component to the other (Mesquita 8L Frijda, 1992; Mesquita, Frijda, 8L Scherer,
1997). Because in Study 1 structural equivalence was found for words of shame
and guilt, in Study 2 it was expected that structural equivalence of emotion
components associated with shame and guilt might also be found between
[ndonesians and Dutch.
Distinct emotion components for shame and guilt have been suggested in
both theoretical and empirical analyses. Early conceptions distinguished these
emotions on the basis of an internal or external locus of sanction (e.g., Parsons
8z Shils, 1952), with shame originating from exposure of one's transgression or
flaws to an external audience, and guilt from a violation of one's own standards
of conduct or condemnation by an internalized authority figure. Recent
conceptions mostly follow Lewis (1971), who posited that the focus of negative
affect pertains to the whole self in shame, and to a concrete behavior in guilt.
This self - behavior distinction has been extensively studied by Tangney and
colleagues (e.g., Tangney, 1995, 1998; Tangney 8c Dearing, 2002) and is
suggested to explain distinct experiences, motivations, and behaviors for shame
and guilt. There seems to be evidence for both conceptions, with shame relating
both to a focus on the self and to public exposure, and guilt both to a focus on
the behavior and to internal morality (e.g., Fontaine et al., 2003; Smith,
Webster, Parrott, 8~ Eyre, 2002). Characteristics of shame and guilt found in
empirical studies also tend to be compatible with both conceptions (e.g., Frijda,
1993; Frijda, Kuipers, ~ Ter Schure, 1989; Manstead 8z Tetlock, 1989; Mauro,
Sato, 8c Tucker, 1992; Roseman, Antoniou, 8z Jose, 1996; Roseman, Wiest, 8c
Schwartz, 1994; Scherer, 1997; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, 8z Barlow, 1996;
Wallbott 8z Scherer, 1995).
There are indications that some of the shame and guilt characteristics are
shared across cultures. For example, Wallbott and Scherer (1995; Scherer 8z
Wallbott, 1994) found similarities in emotion components associated with
shame or guilt. Hong and Chiu (1992) reported strong resemblance of shame
and guilt experiences by Chinese compared to Western samples (see also
Mingyi 8c Yianli, 2002). A recent study by Fontaine et al. (2003) in Peru and
Belgium found that distinctions between shame and guilt across various
emotion components were very similar between these cultures.
For the present study, 38 characteristics from six emotion components were
selected as well as nine emotion terms that have been reported to be more
typical of either shame or guilt experiences. The emotion components were
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appraisals, self-experiences, action tendencies, body sensations, rumination and,
social sharing.
Appraisals. Shame was expected to be more related to appraisals of (1)
being at the center of attention, (2) others disapproving of what one has done,
(3) harm to one's reputation, (4) having lost control over the situation, (5) not
having expected what happened, and (6) falling short of the expectations of
others. Guilt was expected to be related more to appraisals of (7) having done
damage to someone, (8) being responsible for what happened, (9) having
violated a social or moral norm, (10) deserving to be punished, and (11) falling
short of one's own expectations (see Fontaine et al., 2003; Frijda, 1993; Frijda,
Kuipers, 8z Ter Schure, 1989; Manstead 8z Tetlock, 1989; Mauro, Sato, 8c
Tucker, 1992; Roseman, Antoniou, 8c Jose, 1996; Roseman, Wiest, 8z Schwartz,
1994; Smits 8c De Boeck, 2003).
Self-experiences. Of both emotions, shame is reported to involve a stronger
focus on the self. Shame was expected to involve experiences of the self as (1)
confused, (2) isolated from others, (3) powerless and small, and (4) weak and
incompetent. Guilt was expected to involve experiences of being a(5) bad
person (see Fontaine et al., 2003; Roseman, Wiest, 8i Schwartz, 1994; Tangney,
Miller, Flicker, 8t Barlow, 1996).
Action tendencies. Shame was expected to be related more to tendencies of
(1) avoiding the gaze of others, (2) hiding oneself trom others, (3) smiling about
what happened, (4) improving oneself. Guilt was expected to be related more to
tendencies of (5) apologizing, (6) changing future behavior, (7) explaining what
happened to others, (8) punishing oneself, and (9) repairing damage done (see
Fontaine et al., 2003; Frijda, 1993; Frijda, Kuipers, 8z Ter Schure, 1989;
Roseman, Wiest, 8z Schwartz, 1994; Smits 8c De Boeck, 2003).
Bodv sensations. Shame is reported to be the emotion that involves more
physical sensations, especially sensations of activation. Hence, shame was
expected to be associated with (1) blushing, (2) feeling warm, (3) trembling, (4)
heart beating faster, (5) sweating, and (6) feeling weak in the limbs. Guilt was
expected to be associated with (7) getting pale, (8) feeling cold, and (9) feeling
a lump in the throat (see Roseman, Wiest, 8z Schwartz, 1994).
Rumination. Because shame is reported to be the more painful emotion
(Tangney, Miller, Flicker, 8t Barlow, 1996), it was expected to be related more
to ( I) trying to forget about what happened, and guilt more to (2) ruminating
about what happened (see Smits 8z De Boeck, 2003; Rimé, Mesquita, Philippot,
8t Boca, 1991).
Social sharing. For the same reason shame was expected to lead to (1)
avoiding others from knowing what happened, and guilt to (2) talk to others
about what happened (see Rimé, Mesquita, Philippot, 8z Boca, 1991).
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Emotion terms. Among the emotion terms were (1) shame and (2) guilt.
Other emotions that were expected to be more related to shame were (3) fear,
and (4) angry with others. Emotions that were expected to be more related to
guilt were (5) regret, (6) sadness, (7) remorse, (8) disappointed with oneself,
and (9) angry with oneself (see Fontaine et al., 2003; Heider, 1991; Tangney,
Wagner, Fletcher, 8z Gramzow, 1992).
In order to investigate whether cross-cultural differences in shame and guilt
could be explained by differences between individualist and collectivist
cultures, the samples of Study 1 were extended with Mexicans. In many studies
comparisons between individualist and collectivist cultures amount to
comparisons between Asian and Western (i.e., U.S.A.~European) samples
(Oyserman, Coon, 8c Kemmelmeier, 2002). The Mexicans represent a culture
that is high on collectivism (Hofstede, 1980, 2001) but that is not Asian,
providing a better test for an explanation differences in terms of this dimension.
In addition, a sample of Flemish Belgians was included, who share a common
language and much of their cultural heritage with the Dutch. This allowed for an
estimate of a base-rate variation that can be expected between two highly
related cultural samples.
In Study 1, structural equivalence was found for shame and guilt using an
instrument in the English language. This suggests that the underlying emotion
processes are also similar. In Study 2 instruments were translated into the local
language. If shame and guilt are equivalent across cultures, then structural
equivalence should also be found using linguistic equivalents in the participant's
native language (see Fontaine et al., 2002).
Following the results from Study 1, it was hypothesized that:
l. Emotion components associated with either shame or guilt should be
structurally equivalent in all four samples.
2. Ratings of shame and guilt should be correlated stronger in Belgium and
the Netherlands than in Indonesia and Mexico.
3. Ratings of guilt should be relatively higher (i.e., after centering on the
cultural mean) in Indonesia and Mexico than in Belgium and the Netherlands.
4. Limited cross-cultural differences should be found in tenns of relative
effect sizes in ANOVA analyses.
Method
Participants
In the study participated 481 undergraduate students: 115 Flemish-speaking
students (90 female, 25 male) at the Catholic University of Leuven in Belgium
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with a mean age of 19.73 (SD - 1.62), 120 students (75 female, 45 male) at
Sanata Dharma University in Indonesia with a mean age of 21.30 (SD - 1.23),
126 students (101 female, 25 male) at the Universidad Autónoma de Ciudad
Juárez in Mexico with a mean age of 22.65 (SD - 6.19), and 120 students (94
female, 26 male) at Tilburg University in the Netherlands with a mean age of
19.93 (SD - 3.34). Participation was voluntary and anonymous.
Belgian and Dutch students participated in partial fulfillment of a course
requirement. Indonesian students were paid 7,000 Indonesian rupiah (at the time
of the study approximately 1 US dollar). Mexican students participated within
the frame of a series of guest lectures on cross-cultural psychology.
Instrument
Each of the three versions of the instrument consisted of a questionnaire with 5
short situation descriptions, each accompanied by a list of 47 emotion
characteristics (] 1 appraisals, 5 self-experiences, 9 action tendencies, 9 body
sensations, 2 rumination, 2 social sharing, and 9 emotion words). Situations
were provided in a separate booklet. On the response sheets, participants
indicated the intensity with which they would experience each of the emotion
components for each situation, using a 6-point Likert scale ranging from 0(not
at all) to 5 (very strongly).
Preliminary tests of the instrument showed that 5 situations was about the
maximum number that students could rate without loss of accuracy due to
concentration problems of fatigue. This increased the possibility of finding
differences due to situation-specific factors that would not be representative of
the general domains of shame and guilt. In order to assess characteristics of
shame and guilt across a wider range of situations, three versions of the
instrument were created, each with a set of 5 situations.
Within each sample, participants were arbitrarily divided over 3 versions of
the questionnaire. In Version 1 participated l64 students (40 Belgians, 41
Indonesians, 41 Mexicans, and 42 Dutch); in Version 2 participated 161
students (38 Belgians, 40 Indonesians, 43 Mexicans, and 40 Dutch); and in
Version 3 participated 156 students (37 Belgians, 39 Indonesians, 42 Mexicans,
and 38 Dutch).
The total set of 15 situations consisted of strong shame (N - 5), strong guilt
(N - 5), and strong shame and guilt (N - 5) evoking situations selected on the
basis of Study 1. For each of the 201 equivalent situations in Study 1, difference
measures (difn3 were calculated between ratings of shame and of guilt. These
3 DÍÍfeCeilCe C~lff- (IÍ7shamè Mguih~~~~óshame7faguilt, - 2~Ylshame,guiltl~óshame~óguilt~
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can be interpreted similarly to Cohen's d(Cohen, 1988). Situations were
selected from Study 1 on the basis of the following criteria: (i) a large difference
( ~ diff~ ~ . 80) between shame and guilt ratings for the strong shame and the
strong guilt situations and a small difference ( ~ d~~ ~.20) between these
emotions for the strong shame plus guilt situations, (ii) at most a small effect
(rl`' ~.03) for culture and gender in repeated measures ANOVA analyses per
situation with culture ( 2) and gender (2) as between-subject factors and emotion
(5) as within-subject factor, (iii) average ratings higher than 3.5 on the target
emotions ( i.e., shame, guilt, or shame and guilt), (iv) average ratings lower than
2.5 on the other emotions.
Situations were divided over the three versions in such a way that each
version contained at least one situation from all three categories ( i.e., shame,
guilt, or shame and guilt evoking situations). Each version started with a
situation from a different category and situations of the same category within
one version were never in consecutive positions.
Situation descriptions w'ere adapted so that the gender of all persons in the
situation descriptions was the same as that of the participant: female participants
received situations featuring only females, male participants received the same
situations featuring males. The translations of the situations from English into
Indonesian and Spanish were made by several local bilinguals, using a
committee approach ( Van de Vijver 8c Leung, 1997). The Dutch translation was
made using a baek-translation approach.
Results
Prior to the analyses, missing values in the data (~ O.Olo~o) were replaced by the
sample mean on the variable.
Correlations among emotion characteristics
ln order to examine the relationships among emotion characteristics, the three
versions were combined in a situation (15) x item (47) matrix for each sample
separately, with each cell representing the mean rating of an item in a situation.
Combining the three versions limits the interpretation of data to sample-level,
but it allows for a more stable estimate of relations between the emotion
characteristics on the basis of all 15 situations.
Bivariate correlations were calculated between all 47 items on the ratings
across 15 situations. Table 3 shows for all samples the correlations both of
shame-ratings and of guilt-ratings with ratings of the other emotion
characteristics, and also of these emotions with each other. The correlations
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between shame and guilt were not significant in any sample, indicating that
these emotions were rated as independent constructs within the domain of
situations that were selected for this study. In addition, many emotion
characteristics were related strongly either to shame or to guilt. In all four
samples, the correlation patterns of variables with shame and with guilt were
strongly negatively correlated (between -.81 and -.56 across samples). These
correlation patterns were also very similar between samples. Guilt patterns
correlated between .89 and .99 across samples, and shame patterns between .85
and .96. The correlations between Belgians and Dutch were highest (i.e., .99 for
guilt and .96 for shame). These results indicated both divergence between
shame and guilt patterns within samples, and convergence between samples for
both the correlation pattern of shame and for that of guilt. There are some
salient between-sample differences in these patterns (e.g., with unexpectec~, but
these are relatively few compared to the similarities.
Dimensions underlying the correlations
In order to examine cultural variation in the complete correlation matrices, for
each sample these were represented along a single dimension using
Multidimensional Scaling (Proxscal in SPSS 11.5). With MDS, correlations can
be treated as measures of dissimilariry between items, with negatively
correlated items positioned further apart and positively correlated items
positioned closer together. In each sample, a unidimensional representation was
sufficient to account for .96 to .98 of the dispersion.
The individual sample representations were then compared using a
Generalized Procrustes Analysis (GPA, Commandeur, 1996). GPA calculates a
centroid configuration of the four samples representations through
transformations that leave the relative distances between items intact (see
Fontaine et al. 2003). Generally, a fit ~.90 (810~0 of the squared distances
accounted for) can be seen as an indication of cross-cultural similarities in the
sample representations. GPA rotation resulted in a centroid configuration that
could account for 860~0 of the squared distances in the four sample
representations. Inspection of fit at item level showed that for 12 items the
centroid accounted for less than 640~0 of the squared distances. Most cross-
cultural differences could be found in these items. In addition, a GPA with only
the Belgian and Dutch representations produced a near perfect fit, accounting
for 980~0 of the squared distances in both samples. Because the cluster of two
nearly identical samples might lead to an overestimation of cross-cultural
similarities if both were included separately in cross-cultural comparisons, it
was decided to use their centroid configuration to represent the combined
samples in subsequent analyses.
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Corr-elations Bertiveen Ratings qfShume, Ratings o~'Gtrilt, and Ratings of Other Emotion Characteri,rtics ~or Fota-Cultures
Predicted Mexicans Dutch lndonesians Belgians
Items association Guilt Shame Guilt Shame Guilt Shame Guilt Shame
Guilt -- .04 -- -.28 -- -.34 -- -.37
Sl~ame .04 -- -.28 -- -.34 -- -.37 --
Center ofattention Shame -.34 .72"" -.77"" .61 ` -.48 .79"" -.71 " .71 ""
Others disapprove Shame 95`" .l 1 .90"" -.OS .88"" -.Ol .90`" -.l 1
Harms reputation Shame .76" .53" .39 .45 .52" .42 .31 .58"
Lost control Shame .91 "" .34 .91 "" -.10 .69"` .30 .93`" -.12
Unexpected Shame .57` .26 -.29 .55" .42 .20 -.27 .46
Expectations others Shame .89"" -.08 .90"` -20 .91 "" -.45 .91 "` -.31
Done damage Guilt .96'" .02 .97`" -.18 .99"` -.36 .94" -.30
Responsible Guilt .95" -.Ol .89" -.06 .94"` -.18 .97"" -.25
Norm violated Guilt .61" .54` .08 .71" .32 .66"` .12 .50
Deserve punishment Guilt .91 "' .29 .90"" .02 .91 "" -.03 .88" .Ol
Personal expectations Guilt .89"` .30 .82" .04 .49 .22 .83"` .00
Confused Shame .44 .68"` -.33 .75`" -.14 .56" -.46 .73""
Isolated Shame .65'" .44 -.23 .45 .50 .46 -.18 .39
Powerless and small Shame .55` .72"" -.46 .77"" -.04 .76"" -.41 .65""
Weak person Shame .58" .55` .25 .52" .14 .62" .07 .60`
Bad person Guilt .96"" .16 .93"` -.09 .71"" .29 .88"` .02
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Guilt Shame Guilt Shame Guilt Shame
-.68" .75`" -.41 .85" -.61 ` .89"`
-.90" .26 -.94"` .39 -.89" .32
.85" -.06 .66" .30 .84" -.03
.80" -.52` .79" -.55` .79" -.64"
.76"` .09 .57' .26 .76" -.02
.49 -.46 .49 -.73" .33 -.58'
.87" .00 .59` .37 .85"' .ll
.94`" -.30 .88" -.35 .97" -.46
-.78`" .67" -.63` .87" -.85" .70"`
-.65" .75" -.37 .84" -.64"` .77"`
-.20 .70" -.10 .76" -21 .75"
-.31 .78'" -.18 .78" -.35 .78"
-.41 .76" -.14 .78" -.35 .86"
.22 .50 -.06 .80" .08 .58"
.71 "` .26 .OS .69" .50 .31
.43 .34 -.13 .88" .27 .52"
.46 .17 .03 .78" .47 .35
.54' .33 .07 .66" .48 .29
-.71" .45 -.53` .65" -.84" .64`











Predicted Mexicans Dutch Indonesians Belgians
association Guilt Shame Guilt Shame Guilt Shame Guilt Shame
Shame .35 .66" -.04 .67" -.14 .71 " .07 .72"
Shame .48 .49 .OS .54` .37 .58" .06 .59`
Sharne .04 .44 -.14 .37 -.OS .66" -.15 .64"
Guilt .94" -.07 .92" -.23 .89" -.02 .95" -.44
Guilt .88" .13 .69" .19 .75" -.Ol .74" -.OS
Guilt .97" .Ol .97" -.18 .90" -.03 .97"` -.38
Guilt .87" .39 .89" A6 .62` .38 .87" .Ol
Guilt .87`" .36 .77" .29 .48 .53` .78" .16
~`p~.05.~`~`p~.01.
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explaining to others what happened
apologizing
repairing
failing the expectations of others
having done damage to someone
guilt




deserving to be punished
sadness
being a bad person
improving oneself
violating a moral or social norm
change behavior in the future














avoiding the gaze of others
trying to forget about what happened
being the center of attention
blushing
smiling about what happened
Figure 1




















ASSESSING (NON)IDENTITY OF SH.AME AND GUILT
The main effect of culture is substantial in all three versions. Post-hoc
inspection of ineans (using Tukey's honestly significant difference with a-
.OS) showed that in all three versions Indonesians scored highest, followed by
the Dutch and Belgians, and that Mexicans scored lowest (ps ~.OS). All
interaction effects involving culture are low to moderate (all rl'` ~.07; Cohen,
1988) and much smaller than the main effects of situation and of item, and than
the situation x item interactions. These effect sizes suggest that there is limited
cultural variation in ratings of situations, items, and the differentiation of items
across situations (see Scherer 8z Wallbott, 1994).
Table 4
Estimates of Effect Size (rl2) in Repeated Measures ANOVAs n~ith Four
Cultzzral Samples and Five Sitzzations for Three Versions of !he Instr.znraent
Source Version 1 Version 2 Version 3
Between-subjects





I ~` C .06








Note. All effects and interactions were significant (ps ~.Ol ).
Discussion
In line with the first hypothesis, evidence was found for structural equivalence
for a substantial set of emotion components. A single guilt-shame dimension
could adequately represent correlations among emotion characteristics in every
sample. In addition, positions along this dimension were cross-culturally similar
for most characteristics, even by the strict standards (i.e., structure fit ~.90, and
item fit ~.80) that were used to identify structural similarity. These findings
strongly suggest that experiences of shame and guilt share various distinct
characteristics across cultures (Fontaine et al., 2003; Hong 8z Chiu, 1992).
No evidence was found that a distinction between individualist (i.e.,
Belgians and Dutch) and collectivist (i.e., Indonesians and Mexicans) samples
could explain cross-cultural differences in this study. Contrary to the second
hypothesis, no significant correlation was found between ratings of shame and
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guilt in any sample. Contrary to the third hypothesis, relative ratings of guilt by
the Mexicans were not higher than with the Belgians or the Dutch. Only in two
out of three versions of the instrument did Indonesians rate guilt relatively
higher. This makes interpretations in terms of broad cultural differences such as
individualism-collectivism unlikely. Finally, in line with the fourth hypothesis,
ANOVA analyses showed only limited cross-cultural differences in the rating of
situations, emotion items, and ratings of emotion items across situations.
Cross-cultural differences were mostly found in the association of specific
characteristics with either shame or guilt. Because a strict criterion was used to
identify such differences (i.e., item fit ~.80) some of the items Figure 2 show
only very limited cultural variation in their position on the shame-guilt
dimension. In addition, no clear cultural pattern was found in these differences.
The Mexicans did not appear to differ more from Belgians~Dutch than from
Indonesians. However, several culturally different characteristics (e.g.,
unexpected, powerless and small, isolated, lump in the throat, getting pnle,
rvminating) followed the predicted associations more clearly with the
Belgian~Dutch than with both other samples. This suggests some Western bias
in the emotion literature when it comes to the association of these characteristics
with shame or guilt.
Most items in Figure 1 fit the predicted associations with either shame or
guilt. Three exceptions were fáiling the expectations of others, others will
disapprove, and improving oneself, which were expected to be associated with
shame but found to associate with guilt in all samples. Items associated with
shame or guilt contributed about equally to cross-cultural differences; of the 12
items that were treated as cross-culturally different seven were shame items and
five were guilt items. In comparison with guilt, shame seemed to be
characterized by greater bodily activation and a strong tendency to hide,
conceal, and forget. Guilt, on the other hand, appeared the more `cognitive'
emotion, characterized by a preoccupation with a personal failure or
transgression and a strong tendency to repair, apologize, and punish or improve
oneself and one's behavior.
The MDS representation (Figure I) and the correlations (Table 3) give
complementary information on emotion characteristics. For example, the two
items with most extreme positions on the guilt - shame dimension (i.e.,
explaining to others and smiling) appeared to owe this position to a negative
association with the opposite emotion rather than to a strong positive
association with the target emotion (i.e., in Table 3, guilt was negatively
correlated with smiling, and shame negatively with explaining). In contrast, the
two items that came second (i.e., apologizing and blushing) showed strongly
positive correlations with respectively guilt and shame, as well as negative
64
,4SSFSSING (NON)IDENTITY' OF SHAME AND Gl!ILl
correlations with the other emotion. Similarly, the item showing most cultural
differences in Figure 2(i.e., tulk to othefs) was not strongly correlated with
either emotion in any culture. The second and third most culturally different
items (i.e., unexpected and powerless aizd small) were more strongly correlated
with either shame or guilt, suggesting that these differences may be more
relevant in the present context .
General Discussion
This study set out to give a detailed empirical assessment of the extent of
cross-cultural variation in shame and guilt. Evidence was found for structural
equivalence in ratings of shame and guilt across a wide range of situations
(Study 1), as well as in emotion components associated with each of these two
emotions (Study 2). In addition, ANOVA analyses in both studies suggested
only limited cross-cultural variation in quantitative aspects. Cross-cultural
differences were mainly found in the relatedness of shame and guilt experiences
(Study l) and in the association of specific emotion characteristics with either
shame or guilt (Study 2). Differences in the relative intensity of shame and guilt
experiences did not show a clear pattern across studies, except that Indonesians
tended to experience guilt more intensely.
The cross-cultural similarities in the results appear to indicate that cultural
variations in shame and guilt are constrained by the universal characteristics of
these emotions (Poortinga 8c Soudijn, 2002) and should be interpreted
accordingly. There may be cross-cultural differences in shame and guilt in
specitíc meanings (e.g., Liem, 1997; Menon 8c Shweder, 2000), in the
distinctness of these emotions (e.g., Marsella, Murray, 8z Golden, 1974;
Wallbott 8c Scherer, 1995), or in relations with particular concerns or values
(e.g., Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, 8c Fischer, 2002), but these cannot be
interpreted to indicate non-identity of the emotion processes in themselves.
There appears to be a core of cross-culturally similar emotion components
associated with either shame or guilt. This view of shame and guilt is not
necessarily at variance with research focusing on cross-cultural differences, as
long as such differences are interpreted in relation to the universal constraints
implied by cross-culturally similar characteristics of shame and guilt.
To conclude, the two studies presented in this chapter cannot pretend to
give a definite assessment of universality and cultural relativity in emotions.
However, they do narrow down the range of plausible positions. In view of the
results, positions claiming non-identity of shame and guilt as well as positions
assuming full equivalence of these emotions are implausible. Additional studies
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are needed to examine in more detail where and how cultural samples are
similar and where they are different in shame and guilt. A strategy aimed at
identifying cultural differences within the frame of cross-cultural similarities
seems most pmmising for the assessment of the importance and the direction of
cross-cultural diffèrences.
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Appendix
Table A1
Positions and Proportion of Distances Explained ofItems















































































































Positions and Mean Absolute Distances of Culturally Different Items on a





Indonesia Mexico Netherlands Distance
Talk to others -0.33 0.01 -0.06 0.23
Unexpected -0.09 -0.06 0.17 0.18
Powerless and small 0.07 0.02 0.16 0.09
Isolated -0.02 -0.03 0.10 0.09
Lump in the throat 0.06 -0.06 -0.06 0.08
Feeling cold shivers 0.07 0.08 -0.03 0.08
Getting pale 0.10 0.06 -0.01 0.07
Ruminating 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 0.06
Weak limbs 0.09 0.1 1 0.03 0.05
Lost control 0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.04
Harms reputation -0.04 -0.05 -0.01 0.03
Weak and incompetent 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.03
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Emotion without a word: Studies of shame and guilt
with Rarámuri Indians and Javanese
In the preparations for a study on emotions with Rarámuri Indians from
Northern Mexico (Chapter 2) no clear translation was found for the English
emotion tern~ guilt in the Rarámuri language. Shame was the emotion word
typically reported in response to various guilt-evoking situations (see Keltner 8z
Buswell, 1996) that were probed with several informants. The present study
investigated to what extent distinct emotional experiences of shame and guilt
could be found with the Rarámuri, given the absence of a clear term for guilt.
This question seems pivotal to the cross-cultural study of emotion because
the relationship between emotion words and emotion processes is still debated.
While some scholars see cultural differences in the emotion lexicon as
reflecting differences in emotions (e.g., Heelas, 1986; Shweder 8c Haidt, 2000;
Wierzbicka, 1998), others assume that emotion processes can be cross-
culturally similar even if the lexicon differs (e.g., Ekman, 1994; Frijda,
Markam, Sato, 8c Wiers, 1995; Riezler, 1943). Proponents of both positions
tend to draw support from different types of evidence. Cultural studies generally
focus on the meaning of specific emotions within a single cultural group (e.g.,
Lutz, 1988; Menon 8z Shweder, 1994), whereas culture-comparative studies
focus on similarities and differences between several cultural groups in the
characteristics of a fixed set of emotions (e.g., Roseman, Dhawan, Rettek,
Naidu, 8z Thappa, 1995; Scherer 8~ Wallbott, 1994). Both approaches have been
criticized for giving a biased view of cultural variation. The culture-comparative
methodology has been accused of imposing Western (i.e., English-language)
terms upon emotional experiences in different cultures (see Russell, 1994;
Wierzbicka, 1992), and cultural approaches have been argued to lack a standard
of comparison against which claims of cultural differences can be assessed
(Poortinga, 1992).
The debate on emotion processes and emotion words has important
consequences for the possibility of comparing emotional experiences across
cultures. If the culture-comparative method is intrinsically biased, then it seems
that psychology should limit itself to a description of emotions in various
cultures (see Misra 8z Gergen, 1993). On the other hand, if a standard of
comparison can be found that does not impose Western categories upon the
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data, then studies of cross-cultural similarities and differences in emotions are
meaningful.
Frijda et aL (1995) have taken the position that emotion processes can be
compared across cultures through their characteristic emotion components, even
if emotion terms are different. However, Wierzbicka (1995) has argued that
such a comparison still rests on the questionable assumption that emotion
components can be formulated in universal terms. A possible solution to the
imposition of Western emotion constructs in culture-comparative studies has
been proposed by Fontaine, Poortinga, Setiadi, and Markam (2002). They have
presented an empirical strategy for identifying standards of cross-cultural
comparison, in which the basis for comparisons is derived from the data of the
cultural samples, rather than determined in advance. That is, relationships
between emotion constructs are first examined within cultural samples (an
"emic strategy"; Berry, Poortinga, Segall 8z Dasen, 2002), and only then
compared between cultures in order examine cross-cultural similarities
("derived etics"; Berry et al.) and differences.
In a recent study on shame and guilt (Fontaine et al., 2003) this approach
has been successfully applied in identifying various emotion components that
were distinctly associated with either shame or guilt across samples from
different cultural backgrounds (i.e., Belgians and Peruvians). In this study, the
association of emotion components in response to various situations was first
determined for each sample separately and then compared across samples. This
produced a cross-culturally similar constellation of emotion characteristics
associated either with shame or with guilt, which was subsequently used to
identify cross-cultural differences. The findings concur with other cross-cultural
comparisons of shame and guilt components (Hong 8z Chiu, 1992; Wallbott 8t
Scherer, 1995). These studies suggest that many of the characteristics that are
associated with shame or guilt in the (Western) emotion literature (e.g., Frijda,
1993; Frijda, Kuipers, 8z Ter Schure, 1989; Manstead 8z Tetlock, 1989;
Roseman, Antoniou, 8t Jose, 1996; Roseman, Wiest, 8z Schwartz, 1994;
Scherer, 1997; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, 8z Barlow, 1996) can also be found in
other cultural groups.
Culture-comparative studies of shame and guilt are limited in that most
evidence of cross-cultural similarities has been gathered with student samples.
Reviews and meta-analyses of studies on emotion suggest that more cross-
cultural differences are found when non-Western, non-student samples are
included (e.g., Russell, 1994; Van Hemert, 2003). This means that a comparison
of students with the Rarámuri, most of whom have received little formal
education at Mexican schools, might yield more cultural differences even if a
linguistic equivalent of guilt in the Rarámuri language were available.
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In order to get a better estimate of the cultural variation when characteristics
of shame and guilt are studied in non-Western, non-student samples, the present
study also included a sample of rural Javanese. The Javanese were chosen
because they were culturally distant from both Western student samples and the
Rarámuri. In addition, shame (isin) has been argued to be a central emotion in
traditional Javanese culture in the regulation of interpersonal relations,
especially in relation to the concept of respect (Geertz, 1959). A person who has
isirr is seen as a virtuous person and a sense of isin is taught to children from a
very young age (Keeler, 1987). This does not mean that isin is necessarily a
desirable emotion. Many of the rules for interpersonal conduct are aimed at
avoiding experiences of isin (Magnis-Suseno, 1997). So, the Rarámuri and the
Javanese are both non-Western groups that, for very different reasons, appear to
emphasize shame over guilt as the dominant social emotion. This in contrast to
Western culture, which has been argued to emphasize guilt over shame (see
Scheff, 1995, 2001). Hence, the study of shame and guilt in the Rarámuri and
Javanese should optimize the probability of finding differences with the results
of previous studies, if these were biased towards Western culture.
In the ethnographic literature on the Rarámuri, some indications were found
that guilt as an emotion did exist, even though no clear emotion term was found.
Several descriptions of events and behaviors would qualify as a reflection of
guilt in a Western context, for example confessing a theft (Bennett 8z Zingg,
1935~1976, p. 337). In addition, the Rarámuri have been frequently described as
very conscious of "doing right", not to steal, disturb or harm others in any way
(Heras Quezada, 2000; Merrill, 1988). [n preparatory tïeld interviews, thoughts
and behaviors typically ass~ciated with guilt, such as feeling responsible for
having done damage to someone and engaging in reparative behavior seemed to
be readily recognized by local informants. However, such experiences seemed
to be described with the same emotion label as experiences of shame.
In view of the substantial cross-cultural similarities found in previous
culture-comparative studies on shame and guilt, it was expected that shame and
guilt would be found as distinct emotions in both Rarámuri and Javanese.
Hence, this study departed from a position of psychological universalism
(Berry, Poortinga, Segall, 8z Dasen, 2002; Poortinga 8c Soudijn, 2002),
according to which basic psychological processes (i.e., the emotions of "shame"
and "guilt") can be expected to be found across cultures, but that also allows for
differences in the specific cultural manifestations of these processes (e.g.,
labeling with a single or more emotion terms).
Two empirical studies of shame and guilt were done with the Rarámuri and
the Javanese. In Study 1, daily situations of shame were gathered with Rarámuri
and situations of shame or guilt were gathered with the Javanese. These were
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rated by students from Indonesia and the Netherlands on the emotions of shame
and of guilt. It was expected that many situations collected from the Rarámuri
would be rated higher on guilt than on shame by the students, because the
emotion word for shame appears to be used by the Rarámuri as a generic label
for experiences of the emotions of both shame and guilt. In contrast, it was
expected that student ratings of the Javanese situations would match the target
emotion they were gathered for (i.e., shame situations rated higher on shame,
and guilt situations higher on guilt). It may be noted that no pertèct
correspondence was expected because situations or situation types reported in
the emotion literature usually do not elicit exclusively shame or exclusively
guilt (e.g., Keltner 8c Buswell, 1996).
Study 2, examined ratings on 31 emotion characteristics from various
etnotion components (e.g., appraisals and action tendencies) in response to
strong shame, guilt, or shame and guilt eliciting situations. These situations
were selected from Study 1; half originated from the Rarámuri and half from the
Javanese. The emotion components were selected from a previous study with
only student samples (Chapter 3) and were either characteristic for the emotion
of shame or for the emotion of guilt. It was expected that ratings of the emotion
components in response to the selected situations would result in a distinct
clustering of shame characteristics and of guilt characteristics with both the
Rarámuri and the Javanese samples, and that this clustering would be similar to
the results that were previously found with student samples.
Studv I - Phase 1
Introduction
This study consisted of two phases. In phase 1, daily situations of shame were
collected from the Rarámuri, and situations of shame and of guilt were collected
from the Javanese. In phase 2, these situations were rated by students from
Indonesia and the Netherlands on the emotions of shame and ofguilt.
As mentioned in the introduction, no clear term in was found in Rarámuri to
translate the emotion of guilt, while other emotions (e.g., joy~happy -
gání'reame or kaiaíliame, fear~afraid - mujatt~á or majaá, and shame~ashamed -
ritt~eera or riia~érama)' could be translated. Field interviews probing situations
~ Several Rarámuri translations can be gi~ en because Rarámuri is not a written language and no
consensual orthography erists. This is complicated by the fact that Rarámuri language has some
phonemes that are not present in English. for example an "r(" consonant. In addition, words may
be pronounced slightly ditterent in the various Rarámuri variants. Hence, the translations given in
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of varying intensity with local informants usually produced responses of shame,
and a few instances of fear and sadness. A Spanish-Rarámuri dictionary
(Brambila, 1983) gave two possible translations of guilt: iviri and chokiru.
When these words were presented to local bilinguals and Rarámuri informants,
neither was found to refer to a feeling of guilt. Iviri seemed to be closest in
meaning to guilt, but only in the legal sense of being responsible, not of.feeli~ig
responsible. The meaning of chokira was more complex, as it referred to the
initial cause, the origin of something, which could be both an object and a social
event. In its social meaning, chokira applied to the person who initiated a chain
of events.
With the Javanese, both words for shame (isin or lingsem) and for guilt
(salah or lepat) could be found. Javanese language has difierent forms,
depending on the relative social status ofthe speakers (Keeler, 1984). The polite
equivalent of isin is lingsem, which is used when the relative status of the
speaker is lower than that of the addressed. According to Koentjaringrat (1985),
both terms signal a position of inferiority in social relationships, but lingsem is a
slightly stronger marker of inferiority. The polite equivalent of salah is lepat.
Method
Participants
In this study participated 54 Rarámuri (20 female, 34 male) with a mean age of
40.57 years (SD - 15.63) and 63 Javanese (31 female, 32 male) with a mean age
of 38.36 years (SD - 17.33).
The Rarámuri resided in small communities located within 30 km from the
town of Guachochi in the Mexican state of Chihuahua. They are a native Indian
group of Uto-Nahua descent, forming the largest indigenous group in northern
Mexico. The Rarámuri are known for their resistance to Spanish, and later
Mexican cultural intluences (Levi, 1998; Merrill, 1988). Traditionally,
individual families live dispersed over the available land, practicing small-scale
agriculture of crops such as maize and beans. Few of the participants (less than
l00~0) had finished (Mexican) primary education and none secondary education.
A local radio station transmits programs in both Rarámuri and Spanish, but
most of the people in this sample had very little access to other mass media.
Javanese participants were sampled from various small villages in the
central south region of Java, located around 40 km from the city of Yogyakarta.
the text are only examples of several variants that were recorded. usually with a similar root (e.g.,
rrtire or rrgue in shame). ln the field, interviewers adapted the emotion words to the variant of
Rarámuri spoken by the interviewee.
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Data were collected in traditional communities where agricultural labor was the
main source of income. Of the participants, IOo~o had not tinished primary
education, 420~o had finished primary education only, and 46o~~ had attended
secondary education (20~o missing).
Instrument and procedure
Descriptions of situations were gathered in open-ended interviews. Participants
were asked to describe a situation in which they had experienced shame (both
Rarámuri and Javanese) or guilt (Javanese only).
Before the interviews were held, local municipal leaders (gober-nadores
with the Rarámuri and dt~siry~ or desa leaders with the Javanese) were contacted
in order to explain the nature of the studies and to ask for approval. When
approval was obtained, the municipal leader informed his community of the
study, and within three days interviews would start. Participants were
approached in their villages by locally trained interviewers, and informed that
participation in the study was voluntary and that all information obtained would
be treated confidentially. Interviewers were not aware of the research questions
and only knew that situation descriptions were gathered for academic purposes.
In Mexico, situations were gathered by three interviewers, one Rarámuri
and two Mexican, all of whom spoke Spanish as well as Rarámuri and who had
extensive experience in interviewing Rarámuri for academic or governmental
organizations. They were known to all municipal leaders and to most of the
Rarámuri participants in this study. In Indonesia, situations were gathered by
four Javanese interviewers who spoke Javanese as their native language and
who were also proticient in English. The interviewers originated from the
region or communities in which the interviews were held. Interviewers in both
countries were trained in several trial interviews and instructed to record
verbatim descriptions of the situations during the interview. After the interview,
situational descriptions were translated into Spanish by the Mexican
interviewers, translated into English, and checked by two independent Mexican
translators. Javanese interviewers translated situation descriptions directly into
English.
Results
A total of 183 situations were generated. Eighty-one situations were collected
from the Rarámuri describing episodes of riu~érama (shame). With the
Javanese, 55 situations of isin~{ingsem (shame), 39 situations of salah~{e~~at
(guilt), and 8 mixed situations of "shamelguilt" were gathered. The mixed
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situations were reported by eight participants who told the interviewers that they
thought shame and guilt were the same emotion. With the Rarámuri, 13
situations were taken out of the data set because they contained brief and
general descriptions of situations (e.g., "When I was at a meeting and there were
many people I did not know") that were very similar to other situations that
were described in more detail
Study 1 - Phase 2
Introduction
In phase 2, all 170 situations that were collected from the Rarámuri and the
Javanese were rated on the emotions of shame and guilt by students from
Indonesia and the Netherlands. The aim of this study was twofold: (i) to test the
expectations regarding ratings of Rarámuri shame situations in comparison with
ratings of Javanese shame and guilt situations, and (ii) to look for situations
originating from both rural samples that were rated to elicit strong shame,
strong guilt, or strong shame and guilt to be used as stimuli in Study 2.
The following two expectations were tested:
1. A substantial number of shame situations collected from the Rarámuri are
rated higher on guilt than on shame by the students.
2. Most shame situations collected from the Javanese are rated higher on




Eighty students from Tilburg University in the Netherlands (61 female, 18 male,
1 missing) with a mean age of 21.58 years (SD - 6.57), and 74 students from
Sanata Dharma University in Indonesia (52 female, 22 male) with a mean age of
21.97 years (SD - 1.77) participated in this study (see Chapter 3).
Instrument
In the situation descriptions collected from Javanese and Rarámuri in phase l,
names of places or specific animals were replaced by generic terms, and any
sentences containing a reference to shame, guilt, or closely related terms was
deleted or, if deletion would disturb the coherence of the description, replaced
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by a neutral substitute (e.g., upset). Participants rated for each situation the
intensity with which they would experience shame and guilt, using a 6-point
Likert-scale ranging from 0("I would not experience this emotion at all") to 5
("I would experience this emotion very strongly").
Procedure
Participants were requested to take part in a study about "emotional episodes as
described by people from different parts of the world". Participation was
voluntary and anonymous. Indonesian students were paid 7.500 Indonesian
rupiah (at the time of the study approximately 1 US dollar) and Dutch students
received course credits.
Results
Unifactorial factor solutions of the ratings of shame and of guilt showed
structural equivalence (Tucker's phi ~.90; Van de Vijver 8t Leung, 1997)
between [ndonesian and Dutch raters for all situations, except for five Javanese
situations and two Rarámuri situations (Chapter 3). These seven situations were
excluded from further analyses.
For both samples, average shame and average guilt ratings were calculated
per situation. From these averages, difference scores (diTf) were calculated such
that each situation had a single score, indicating a higher shame rating if
positive and a higher guilt rating if negative. The intraclass correlation (absolute
agreement) between the two student samples of the difference scores across
situations was very high (ICC -.88; p ~.001), so in further analyses the mean
of the difference scores of both samples is used. The distribution of the
difference scores had a median of 0.19 and ranged from -2.05 to 3.14. This
indicated that slightly more situations were rated higher on shame, and that both
strong shame and guilt situations (~diffj ~ 0.80) were found.
Of the Rarámuri situations, 660~o had a positive difference score (higher
shame than guilt) and 340~o a negative difference score (higher guilt than
shame). Of the Javanese situations, 820~0 of the shame situations had a positive
difference score, and 74o~o of the guilt situations had a negative difference score.
Of the eight shamelguilt situations, five had a positive and three a negative
difference score.
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Discussion
The results contirmed the (tirst) expectation regarding the Rarámuri construct of
shame. More than one-third of the situations that were collected from the
Rarámuri as shame eliciting (rii,~érama) were rated higher on guilt than on
shame by lndonesian and Dutch students. This suggests that situations eliciting
Rarámuri riK~érama may encompass experiences of what would be labeled in
English as emotions of shame and of guilt.
In contrast, 82o~o of the situations that were collected from the Javanese as
eliciting shame (isin~lingsem) were also rated higher on shame than on guilt by
the stude~nts, and 74o~o of the guilt-eliciting (salah~lepat) situations were also
rated higher on guilt. Because no perfect agreement between situation types and
situation ratings was expected (see Keltner 8c Buswell, 1996), these results
confirmed the (second) expectation. The eight mixed shame~guilt situations did
not show a clear pattern in the student ratings.
The presence of strong shame and strong guilt situations in both rural
samples made it possible to use a selection of these situations as "emically
derived" (Berry et al., 2002) stimuli in Study 2, where ratings of emotion
components across situations were compared.
Study ?
Introduction
This study investigated ratings of emotion components in response to a range of
shame eliciting or guilt eliciting situations in the Rarámuri and the Javanese. In
previous studies with student samples from different cultures (Fontaine et al.,
2003) it was found that the correlations of components across such situations
were distinct between shame and guilt. If a similar distinction in emotion
components could be found with the Rarámuri, then this would strongly suggest
that distinct experiences of shame and guilt are present in this group, even in the
absence of a linguistic distinction. Thus, the present study investigated whether
the distinction between shame and guilt characteristics that was found with
student samples could also be found with the Rarámuri and the Javanese.
In Chapter 3 student samples from Belgium, Indonesia, Mexico, and the
Netherlands rated strong shame-eliciting or guilt-eliciting situations on 47
emotion components. Correlations between components across situations were
first analyzed for each sample separately using Multidimensional Scaling
(MDS), and then compared across samples using a Generalized Procrustes
77
CHAPTER 4
Analysis (GPA). These analyses showed substantial cross-cultural similarities in
the differentiation of components associated with shame or with guilt. For the
purpose of comparison with the Rarámuri and the Javanese, the data of Chapter
3 were re-analyzed with only those 31 emotion components that were used in
the present study. In each sample correlations were represented in a two-
dimensional space using MDS (Proxscal in SPSS 11.5) that could account for
almost all of the dispersion (in all samples normalized raw stress -.01).
Comparison of the four sample representations using a GPA (Commandeur,
1996) produced a cross-culturally similar centroid configuration for 29 items
(overall fit ~.90; see Fontaine et al., 2003). Two items (i.e., feelíng alone and
getting pale) were excluded because less than SOo~o (item fit ~.71) of the
squared distances could be accounted for across samples.
The first dimension in the cross-culturally similar configuration
distinguished shame characteristics from guilt characteristics, and the second
dimension externally oriented characteristics from internally oriented
characteristics. These tíndings are similar to those obtained in a comparison
between Belgian and Peruvian students by Fontaine et aL (2003). Emotion
characteristics associated with shame were: appraisals of (1) being at the center
of attention; experiences of the self as (2) confused, (3) powerless and small,
and (4) angry with others; body sensations of (5) blushing, (6) feeling weak in
the limbs, (7) feeling warm, (8) trembling, (9) heart beating faster, and (10)
sweating; action tendencies of (1 1) avoiding the gaze of others, (12) hiding
oneself from others, and (13) smiling about what happened; and (14) trying to
forget about what happened. Emotion characteristics associated with guilt were:
appraisals of (1) having done damage to someone, (2) being responsible for
what happened, (3) others disapproving of what one has done, (4) harm to one's
reputation, (5) having violated a social or moral norm, and (6) deserving to be
punished; experiences of the self as (7) a bad person, and (8) angry with
oneself; action tendencies of (9) apologizing, (10) changing future behavior,
(11) explaining what happened to others, (12) punishing oneself; and (13)
ruminating about what happened. The second dimension was mostly defined by
the externally oriented characteristics of explaining tivhat happened, smiling
about tii~hat happened, and apologizing, and the internally oriented
characteristics of.feeling til~eak in the limbs and harm to one's reputation.
This centroid configuration was used as a reference for comparisons with
the Rarámuri and Javanese samples. It was expected that with these groups a
similar distinction between emotion components would be found in response to
various shame-eliciting or guilt-eliciting situations that had been selected from
Study 1. ]n this report, the Javanese sample are first compared with the student
reference contiguration. and then sarne is done for the Rarámuri.
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The following results were expected:
l. Emotion characteristics associated with shame in the student reference
configuration are similarly associated with these emotions in the Javanese and
in the Rarámuri.
2. Emotion characteristics associated with guilt in the student reference
configuration are similarly associated with this emotion in the Javanese, and are





In this study participated 213 Javanese (107 female, 106 male) with a mean age
of 42.14 years (SD - 15.30). Participants were sampled in different
communities, but in the same region as participants from Study 1. Living
conditions and cultural background of the communities were similar to those
described in Study ] .
Instrument
Each of the six versions of the instrument consisted of three descriptions of
situations, each accompanied by a list of 31 emotion characteristics (7
appraisals, 6 self-experiences, 7 action tendencies, 7 body sensations, 2
rumination, and the emotion words isin~lingsem [shame] and salah~lepat
[guilt]). Participants were arbitrarily divided over six versions of the instrument.
The number of participants per version ranged from 32 to 40.
In interviews, participants were asked to indicate the intensity with which
they would experience each of the emotion characteristics for each situation,
using a 6-point scale that ranged from 0(not at all) to 5 (very st~~ongly). The
scale was visually illustrated by a sheet showing a series of circles of increasing
size, representing the different intensities of the responses.
The situations were selected from Study 1 on the basis of the difference
measures (diffl between ratings of shame and of guilt by the Indonesian and
Dutch students. Nine situations originated from the Rarámuri and nine from the
Javanese. Each set of nine situations included three strong shame-eliciting, three
strong guilt-eliciting, and three strong shame plus guilt eliciting situations, as
rated by the student samples in Study l. Criteria for the selection of situations
were: (i) a large difference Qd~ ~.80) between shame and guilt ratings for the
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strong shame and the strong guilt situations and a small difference (Jdiffj ~ .20)
between these emotions for the strong shame plus guilt situations; ( ii) at most
small effects (rl~ ~.03) for both culture and gender in repeated measures
ANOVA analyses per situation with culture and gender as between-subjects
factors and emotion as within-subjects factor; ( iii) average ratings higher than
3.0 on the target emotions ( i.e., shame, guilt, or shame and guilt); (iv) average
ratings lower than 2.5 on all other emotions. Situations were divided over the
six versions such that each version contained one shame-eliciting situation, one
guilt-eliciting situation, and one shame plus guilt situation. Three versions were
composed of situations derived from the Rarámuri and three versions were
composed of Javanese situations. Rarámuri situations were translated from
English into Javanese by a committee of four professional translators (Van de
Vijver 8z Leung, 1997). Translations were made both in polite Javanese, and in
regular Javanese so that interviewers could adapt their word-use to the form
appropriate in the interviews.
Procedure
Approval of local community leaders was sought prior to data collection,
similar to Study 1. The study was announced in the villages by the local leader
before interviews would start. Participants were approached by the interviewers
with the question if they would be willing to cooperate in a study on thoughts
and feelings that people could have in various situations. Interviewers explained
that they were going to be presented with three situations that other people had
experienced (the situation descriptions) and that they were asked to imagine
how they themselves would have felt in each of these situations. The
interviewer then explained the response scale with the aid of the illustration
sheet and by giving several examples. Generally, participants understood the
task without problems; in cases where the interviewer got the impression that
the task was not understood the interview was ended after the tírst situation and
the data were excluded. In order to avoid biases due to different gender of the
interviewee and the interviewer, women were interviewed by female
interviewers, and men by male interviewers.
Four female and two male Javanese conducted the interviews. All of them
had previous experience with interviewing and were trained in trial interviews
under guidance of an experienced Javanese researcher. Interviews typically took
between 30 and 50 minutes to complete.
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Results
The two items for which insuftícient cross-cultural similarities had been found
with the student samples were excluded from the analyses. The six versions of
the questionnaire were combined in a situations (18) x items (29) matrix, with
each cell representing the mean rating of an item in a situation. Bivariate
correlations were calculated between all 29 emotion characteristics across the
18 situations. The resulting correlation matrix was fít in a two-dimensional
space using Multidimensional Scaling (Proxscal in SPSS 11.5). A
representation using one dimension accounted for .92 of the dispersion, and a
two-dimensional representation for .98.
The Javanese representation was compared with the student contïguration
using GPA. The resulting centroid contïguration could account for 710~0 of the
squared distances between Javanese and students. Inspection of tít at item level
showed that the centroid configuration could account for less than SOo~o of
squared distances in the case of seven items. These items were treated as
culture-specitíc emotion characteristics. In a subsequent GPA on the 22 items
with good fit, culture-specific characteristics were not included in the
calculation of the fit of the centroid configuration, yet their position within this
coniïguration could be determined on the basis of the other items. The centroid
configuration for the 22 items accounted for 83o~0 of the squared distances in the
Javanese and student representations, indicating substantial similarities in the
representations of these items. Figure 1 shows the positions of the 22 items in
the two-dimensional centroid configuration (for all items exact positions and
proportion of squared distances accounted for can be found in Table A 1). In
Figure 2, culturally different items are positioned for both Javanese participants
and students on the cross-culturally shared guilt-shame dimension depicted in
Figure 1. Items were ordered according to the magnitude of cross-cultural
differences on this dimension, calculated by the absolute item distances between
samples, with the least congruent item first (for all items exact positions and
absolute distances can be found in Table A2). The positions of shame and guilt
on the guilt-shame dimension were added to facilitate interpretation. For
example, it can be seen that the item changingfuture behavior is related more to
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conditions and cultural background of the communities were also similar to
those described for Study 1.
Instrument
Participants were arbitrarily divided over six versions of the instrument, which
were the same as described in the study with the Javanese. The number of
participants per version ranged from 36 to 41. Situations were accompanied by
a list of 30 emotion characteristics (7 appraisals, 6 self-experiences, 7 action
tendencies, 7 body sensations, 2 rumination, and the emotion word riwérama).
There were only 30 items because a term for the emotion of guilt could not be
used with the Rarámuri. Situations were translated from English into Spanish,
and checked by two independent Mexican translators. Translations from
Spanish to Rarámuri were done independently by two Rarámuri bilinguals and
any differences were subsequently discussed (Van de Vijver 8c Leung, 1997).
Because of the variations in spoken Rarámuri, multiple translations were
provided to the interviewers where necessary. Interviewers could adapt their
word-use to the specific variant spoken by an interviewee, though the
differences between Rarámuri variants within the region of data collection were
minor.
Procedure
The procedure followed was similar to the study with the Javanese. lnterviews
were done by three female and four male Rarámuri. Five of them had previous
experience in interviewing Rarámuri for governmental organizations and all
were trained in several trial interviews under guidance of an experienced
Rarámuri who had cooperated in Study 1.
Results
The two items for which insufficient cross-cultural similarities had been found
with the student samples were excluded from the analyses. The six versions of
the questionnaire were combined in a situation ( 18) x item (28) matrix, with
each cell representing the mean rating of an item in a situation. Bivariate
correlations were calculated between the 28 emotion characteristics across the
18 situations. The resulting correlation matrix was fit in a two-dimensional
space using Multidimensional Scaling (Proxscal in SPSS 11.5). A
representation using one dimension accounted for .81 of the dispersion, and a
two-dimensional representation for .95.
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The Rarámuri representation was compared with the student configuration
using GPA. The initial centroid configuration could account for 610~0 of the
squared distances between Rarámuri and students. Inspection of fit at item level
showed that the centroid configuration could account for less than SOo~o of
squared distances in the case of nine items. These items were treated as culture-
specitíc characteristics in a subsequent GPA on the 19 items with a good fit. In
addition, the student emotion word guilt was included as a"culture-specific"
item, in order to examine its position within the shared configuration of students
and Rarámuri. The centroid configuration with 19 items accounted for 860~0 of
the squared distances in the Rarámuri and student representations, indicating
substantial similarities in the representations of these items. Figure 3 shows the
positions of the 19 items in the two-dimensional centroid configuration (for all
items exact positions and proportion of squared distances accounted for can be
found in Table A3), plus the position of the emotion word guilt with the
students. In Figure 4, culturally different items are positioned for both Rarámuri
participants and students on the cross-culturally shared guilt-shame dimension
depicted in Figure 3. Items were ordered according to the magnitude of cultural
differences on this dimension, calculated by the absolute item distances between
samples, with the least congruent item tírst (for all items exact positions and
absolute distances can be found in Table A4). The positions of shame and
"student guilt" were added to facilitate interpretation.
Discussion
In line with the expectations (1 and 2), a number of emotion characteristics that
distinguished between shame and guilt in student samples were found to differ
from each other in a similar manner with the Rarámuri, even though a term for
"guilt" was not present with this group. This result indicates that a core
distinction between the emotions shame and guilt can be found universally,
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Of the 28 emotion characteristics, nine were found to be different between
students and Rarámuri, which is slightly more than between students and
Javanese. Four of these characteristics (i.e., b-embling, angrv with oneself,
ruminating, and heart beat.r,faster) show mainly a difference on the internal-
external dimension, but are very similar on the guilt-shame dimension. Two
salient differences (i.e., feeling potii~erless and smcrll and changing future
behavior) differ from the students in a similar way as found for the Javanese,
which makes it less likely that these results are caused by bias. Another salient
difference is the association of blushing with guilt-characteristics by the
Rarámuri. This is in line with other studies suggesting that a strong association
of blushing with shame is not universally shared (e.g., Casimir 8c Schnegg ,
2002; Drummond c~, Kim, 2000; see also Chapter 2).
General Discussion
Several approaches to the analysis of shame and guilt in the Rarámuri and
Javanese data were considered. The choice of comparing each rural sample with
the student reference group was motivated by the observation that almost all
evidence for cross-cultural similarities in shame and guilt so far had been
gathered with student samples. Hence, two separate comparisons were
considered to best answer the question to what extent the results obtained with
students could be generalized to culturally distant nonstudent samples. It can be
noted that other comparisons did not produce substantially different results:
comparison of the Rarámuri and the Javanese as well as comparison of
Rarámuri, Javanese, and students, both resulted in centroid contígurations (fit ~
.90) with 18 cross-culturally similar items.
The distinction between shame and guilt that was found with the Javanese
and with the Rarámuri supports a position of psychological universalism
(Poortinga 8r Soudijn, 2002) regarding these emotions. In response to various
shame-eliciting and guilt-eliciting situations, the Rarámuri, who lack an
emotion word for guilt, showed distinct reactions in terms of associated emotion
components, similar to reactions of shame and guilt found with student samples.
This can be seen as empirical support for the position taken by Frijda et al.
(1995) that emotion components can be used to study emotion processes across
cultures, even if the relevant emotion lexicons differ. Differences in emotion
terms do not necessarily imply differences in emotion processes, as is claimed
by some scholars in cultural anthropology and cultural psychology (e.g., Lutz,
1988; Shweder óc Haidt, 2000).
The studies also illustrate that cross-cultural comparisons on the basis of an
empirically derived standard of comparison as proposed by Fontaine et al.
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(2002) can be used to avoid the imposition of Western emotions or emotion
words. The Javanese and the Rarámuri were compared with students on the
basis of their within-culture organization of emotion characteristics in response
to locally produced situations. Hence, this strategy seems useful in establishing
a common basis against which specific cultural differences in emotions can be
identified. A position of psychological universalism does not imply cross-
cultural invariance in emotions. For example, two emotion characteristics (i.e.,
the selt-experience of feeli~zg ~o~l~erless and small and the action tendency of
changing.fi~ti~re behavior) were associated with shame and guilt in a reverse
manner among both the Javanese and the Rarámuri, when compared to student
samples. Such differences can inform more detailed studies of cultural
variations in shame and guilt experiences in terms of specific cultural factors.
Another example is the Rarámuri association of blushing with guilt-
characteristics, which is in line with other evidence that this body sensation may
not be as strongly related to shame as is often assumed in the (Western) emotion
literature (Casimir 8z Schnegg, 2002; Drummond 8z Kim, 2000; see also
Chapter 2). Furthermore, it is quite likely that there are other typical
characteristics of shame and guilt besides the ones included in this study, that
could also show cross-cultural differences. However, the common core of
shame and guilt characteristics does put constraints upon claims of cultural
variation in these emotions. On the basis of the findings presented in this
chapter, it seems likely that everywhere shame is associated more with exposure
and social withdrawal, and guilt more with being responsible for harm to
someone and social amending. These emotion characteristics were found not to
be dependent upon the presence or absence of a specific emotion label; there





Item Positions and Proportion ofDistances Accounted for by tbe Centroid




s-g dímension i-e dimension accounted for
Apologizing -0.252 0.048 .98
Done damage -0.212 0.012 .98
Explaining -0.205 O.173 .92
Guilty -0.203 -0.008 .98
Being responsible -0.190 -0.024 .98
Moral norm -0.171 -0.021 .99
Bad person -0. ] 53 -0.061 .96
Others disapprove -0.144 -0.034 .89
Punishing self -0.137 -0.019 .99
Angry with self -0.1 10 -0.023 .98
Ruminating -0.083 -0.026 .61
Harms reputation -0.075 -0.070 .95
Sweating 0.078 0.037 .39
Shame 0.101 -0.091 .83
Angry with others 0.103 0.210 .86
Center of attention 0.1 12 0.034 .71
Feeling hot 0.125 0.022 .79
Blushing 0.165 -0.068 .81
Hiding 0.225 -0.011 .97
Evading looks 0.229 -0.050 .94
Trying to forget 0.241 0.033 .94




Positions o~ Culturalh~ Different Items ofJavanese and Students, and Absolute Item
Differences per Dimension
Students Javanese Absolute difference
Item G-S I-E G-S 1-E G-S 1-E
Change behavior -0.15 -0.03 0.07 -0.02 0.21 0.01
Confused 0.09 -0.11 -0.08 0.05 0.17 0.16
Powerless and small 0.09 -0.03 -0.05 -0.1 1 0.14 0.08
Deserving Punishment 0.00 -0.08 -0.13 0.02 0.13 0.10
Weak limbs 0.05 -0.08 -0.02 0.12 0.08 0.20
Heart beats faster 0.12 -0.08 0.06 0.15 0.06 0.23
Trembling 0.10 -0.06 0.06 0.16 0.04 0.23
.Nnte. G-S: guilt - shame dimension, 1-E: internal - external dimension.
Table A3
Item Positions and Proportion qf Distances Accounted, for bv the Cenh-oid
Configuration.for Stzrdents and Rarámtn-i
Position
o~o Distances
ltem S-G dimension I-E dimension accounted for
Done damage -0.223 0.020 1.00
Others disapprove -0.191 -0.042 .93
Being responsible -0.182 -0.039 .95
Bad person -0.166 0.004 .98
Apologizing -0.163 0.118 .85
Moral norm -0.153 -0.002 .98
Punishing self -0.103 -0.035 .93
Harms reputation -0.090 -0.040 .95
Deserving punishment -0.082 -0.102 .73
Explaining -0.061 0.180 .75
Confused -0.017 -0.139 .70
Weak limbs 0.101 -0.157 .81
Feeling hot 0.1 10 -0.096 .84
Center of attention 0.132 -0.019 .78
Sweating 0.144 0.026 .70
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Item S-G dimension I-E dimension accounted tor
Shame 0.144 -0.010 .88
Hiding 0.184 -0.033 .98
Smiling 0.270 0.154 .93
Table A4
Positions of Czdtzrrally Diff ~erent ltems ofRarámzrri and Snrdents, and Absolzrte
Item Differences per Dimension
Students Rarámuri Absolute difference
Item G-S I-E G-S I-E G-S 1-E
Powerless and small 0.08 -0.05 -0.21 0.15 0.29 0.19
Blushing 0.21 -0.04 -0.07 -0.27 0.29 0.23
Change behavior -0.14 -0.02 0.12 -0.04 0.26 0.02
Evading looks 0.18 -0.03 -0.01 -0.10 0.18 0.07
Trying to forget 0.19 -0.04 0.05 0.25 0.14 0.29
Angry at others 0.09 0.10 -0.01 -0.16 0.09 0.26
Trembling 0.09 -0.08 0.12 0.16 0.03 0.23
Angry at self -0.1 1 -0.03 -0.08 0.22 0.03 0.24
Ruminating -0.06 -0.10 -0.09 0.11 0.03 0.21
Heart beats faster 0.10 -0.09 0.1 1 0.25 0.01 0.34
Note. G-S: guilt - shame dimension, I-E: internal - external dimension.
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Cross-cultural (non)equivalence in experiences of
shame and ~uilt
Psychologists seek to explain human behavior through the identifícation of
specific psychological processes, for example emotions. Emotions can motivate
behavior and strong emotions can even gain priority in guiding behavior (Frijda,
1986). Our understanding of why emotions promote certain behaviors lies in
their characteristic experiences on various emotion components (e.g.,
Zeelenberg, Van Dijk, Manstead, 8c Van der Pligt, 2000). Thus, if we want to
know to what extent emotions can be used to explain the behavior of people in
different cultures, we first have to establish to what extent characteristics of
these emotions are equivalent across cultures. This study addresses the cross-
cultural equivalence of two social emotions: shame and guilt.
These emotions have been argued to be important factors in social behavior
(Tangney 8z Fischer, 1995). Although they are closely related, arising in similar
circumstances (e.g., social transgression or personal failure), the behavioral
consequences of shame and guilt appear to be markedly different. Whereas
shame motivates social withdrawal or even antagonistic reactions, guilt
motivates social approach, amending, and repair (e.g, Barrett, Zahn-Waxler, 8z
Cole, 1993; Caprara, Barbaranelli, Pastorelli, Cermak, 8c Rosza, 2001; Lindsay-
Hartz, De Rivera, 8c Mascolo, 1995; Lewis, 1971; Tangney, 1992, 1998;
Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, 8c Gramzow, 1992).
The social contexts in which emotions arise can vary across cultures. This
variation has been argued to have marked effects on the experience of emotions
(Kitayama 8c Markus, 1994). The different cultural contexts have been reported
to lead to different experiences of shame and guilt (e.g., Liem, 1997; Stipek,
1988). In addition, specific cultural values have been reported to lead to
differences in reactions of shame (Rodriguez Mosquera, Manstead, 8c Fischer,
2002). Such findings raise the question to what extent shame and guilt are
comparable across cultures. Tf the characteristics of shame and guilt are
different across cultures, then behaviors associated with these emotions, as
reported in current (Western) emotion literature, cannot be expected to
generalize to other cultural contexts.
Studies that asked participants from various cultures to recall experienees of
shame and of guilt and to rate these on various emotion components found
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evidence for both cross-cultural similarities and differences (Scherer 8c
Wallbott, 1994; Wallbott 8c Scherer, 1995). A limitation of the method used in
such studies is that emotion words may not have a linguistic equivalent in all
cultural gmups (Russell, 1994). This problem has been addressed by asking
participants from various cultures to rate shame-eliciting or guilt-eliciting
situations on various emotion components, including emotion words for shame
and guilt (Fontaine et al., 2003; see also Chapters 3 8z 4). These studies found
evidence for structural equivalence of shame and guilt, with limited cultural
differences in associated emotion components. Such results indicate that the
emotion words for shame and guilt measure similar constructs, at least for the
samples that were studied, supporting the validity of ineasures that use emotion
words as stimuli.
A possible shortcoming of situations as stimuli lies in their selection. As
was noted before, cultures can differ in the types of situations that lead to shame
and guilt. This means that a selected set of situations may underestimate the
cross-cultural variation in these emotions across the full range of naturally
occurring situations. The present study set out to investigate whether cross-
cultural similarities and differences found with a preselected set of situations in
Chapter 3 could be replicated in a study of self-reported shame and guilt
experiences. Similar samples (i.e., Indonesians, Mexicans, and Dutch) were
selected and the same emotion components were used to assess a possible
method effect.
Cross-cultural similarities and differences were examined at three levels (1)
the extent of cross-cultural variation in quantitative analyses, (2) the
correlations between shame and guilt, and (3) the association of emotion
components with shame or guilt.
l. Interpretation of effect sizes in quantitative analyses has been argued to
lead to a more accurate estimate of the extent of cross-cultural variation than
mere interpretation of significance levels (Matsumoto, Grissom, óc Dinnel,
2001; Scherer 8r. Wallbott, 1994). In Chapter 3 it was found that cross-cultural
variation in the ratings of shame and guilt (Chapter 3, Study 1) and of 47
emotion characteristics of shame and guilt (Chapter 3, Study 2) was limited, in
that effect sizes involving culture were generally small relative to the effects of
emotion or emotion characteristics. [n the present study effects involving
culture were also expected to be relatively small, in ANOVAs of ratings of
shame and guilt on different emotion components (Hypothesis 1).
2. Shame and guilt have been argued to be more distinct emotions in
Asian~collectivist countries than in Western~individualist (i.e., Europe and the
U.S.A.) countries (Marsella, Murray, 8c Golden, 1974; Retzinger, 1995;
Wallbott 8~ Scherer, 1995). In Chapter 3 it was found that ratings of shame and
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guilt were positively correlated in the Netherlands, but not in Indonesia across a
wide range of situations (Chapter 3, Study 1). However, in a second study with
selected shame-eliciting or guilt-eliciting situations this finding was not
replicated; no significant correlation was found between shame and guilt in
either sample. It is possible that the selection of situations has obscured a
difference in relatedness of shame and guilt occurring over a wide range of
situations. Hence, the present study tested the hypothesis that ratings of emotion
characteristics on shame should be correlated stronger with ratings of guilt in
the Netherlands than in Indonesia (Hypothesis 2).
3. In the emotion literature, several distinct characteristics of shame and
guilt have been reported on a range of emotion components (e.g., Frijda, 1993;
Frijda, Kuipers, 8c Ter Schure, I989; Manstead 8c Tetlock, 1989; Mauro, Sato,
8z Tucker, 1992; Rimé, Mesquita, Philippot, 8z Boca, 1991; Roseman,
Antoniou, 8z Jose, 1996; Roseman, Wiest, 8z Schwartz, 1994; Smits 8z De
Boeck, 2003; Tangney, Miller, Flicker, 8z Barlow, 1996; Tangney, Wagner,
Fletcher, 8c Gramzow, 1992). In Chapter 3, substantial cross-cultural
similarities were found as well as some differences in the association of shame
or guilt with appraisals, self-experiences, action tendencies, body sensations,
rumination, social sharing, and emotion words. In the present study a replication
of these findings was expected. Some emotion characteristics were expected to
be rated higher on shame than on guilt, and others were expected to be rated
higher on guilt than on shame. The following hypotheses were tested about the
ratings of emotion characteristics for shame and for guilt (Hypothesis 3):
Appraisals. For shame, higher ratings were expected on appraisals of (1)
being at the center of attention, (2) harm to one's reputation, (3) having lost
control over the situation, and (4) not having expected what happened. For guilt,
higher ratings were expected on appraisals of (5) having done damage to
someone, (6) being responsible for what happened, (7) having violated a social
or moral norm, (8) deserving to be punished, (9) falling short of one's own
expectations, (10) others disapproving of what one has done, and (1 ]) falling
short of the expectations of others.
Self-experiences. For shame, higher ratings were expected on experiences of
the self as (1) confused, (2) isolated from others, (3) powerless and small, and
(4) weak and incompetent. For guilt, higher ratings were expected on
experiences of the self as a(5) bad person.
Action tendencies. For shame, higher ratings were expected on action
tendencies of (1) avoiding the gaze of others, (2) hiding oneself from others,
and (3) smiling about what happened. For guilt, higher ratings were expected on
action tendencies of (4) improving oneself, (5) apologizing, (6) changing future
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behavior, (7) explaining what happened to others, (8) punishing oneself, and (9)
repairing damage done.
Body sensations. For shame, higher ratings were expected on sensations of
(1) blushing, (2) feeling warm, (3) trembling, (4) heart beating faster, (5)
sweating, and (6) feeling weak in the limbs. For guilt, higher ratings were
expected on sensations of (7) getting pale, (8) feeling cold, and (9) feeling a
lump in the throat.
Rzrmination. For shame, higher ratings were expected on (1) trying to forget
about what happened. For guilt, higher ratings were expected on (2) ruminating
about what happened.
Social sharing. For shame, higher ratings were expected on (1) avoiding
others from knowing. For guilt, higher ratings were expected on (2) talking to
others about what happened.
Emotion terms. For shame, higher ratings were expected on (1) angry with
others. For guilt, higher ratings were expected on being (2) disappointed with
oneself, and (3) angry with oneself.
4. In addition, it was expected that with Multidimensional Scaling a
unidimensional representation of the differences between shame and guilt
characteristics would show high agreement with the representation of
differences between these characteristics found in Chapter 3(Hypothesis 4).
Method
Participants
In the study participated 244 undergraduate students: 65 students (21 male, 44
female) at Sanata Dharma University in Indonesia with a mean age of 19.94
years (SD - 1.70); 81 students (23 male, 58 female) at the Universidad
Autónoma de Ciudad Juárez in Mexico with a mean age of 22.98 years (SD -
5.53); and 98 students (20 male, 78 female) at Tilburg University in the
Netherlands with a mean age of 20.63 years (SD - 4.14). Participation was
voluntary and anonymous. Indonesian students were paid 7,000 Indonesian
rupiah (at the time of the study approximately 1 US dollar). Mexican students
participated within the frame of a series of guest lectures on cross-cultural
psychology. Dutch students participated as partial fulfillment of a course
requirement.
Instrument
The instrument consisted of a questionnaire divided into two sections: one for
shame and the other for guilt. Each section contained a blank sheet where
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participants could describe a personal experience of shame or guilt. This was
followed by a list of 41 emotion characteristics from various components (11
appraisals, 5 self-experiences, 9 action tendencies, 9 body sensations, 2
rumination, 2 social sharing, and 3 emotion words). On this list participants
indicated the intensity with which they had experienced each of the emotion
components during the episode they had described, using a 6-point Likert scale
ranging from 0(not at al!) to 5 (very stronglv).
The instrument was translated from English into each of the participant's
languages. The translations into Indonesian and Spanish were done by several
local bilinguals, using a committee approach (Van de Vijver 8i Leung, 1997).
Translation into Dutch was done using a back-translation approach. The
following translations of shame and of guilt were used: malu and bersalah in
Indonesian, verguenza and culpa in Spanish, and schaamte and schuld in Dutch.
Procedure
Participants were requested to take part in a study on the way that people from
different parts of the world experience shame and guilt. They were assured that
the study was anonymous and that all data would be treated confidentially.
Completing the questionnaire usually took about 30 minutes.
Results
Before the analyses, missing values (0.020~0) in the data were replaced by the
sample mean on the variable.
General estimates of cultural variation
The extent of cultural variation in the data was assessed by a repeated measures
ANOVA with culture (3 levels) as between-subjects factor, and emotion (2
levels) and item (i.e., emotion components; 41 levels) as within-subjects factors.
The results of this analysis can be found in Table 1. In line with the
expectations, all effects involving culture are relatively small in comparison to
the effects of Item and the Emotion x Item interaction (see Cohen, 1988). This
indicates that there are substantial differences in the rating of items (i.e.,
emotion characteristics) between the two emotions, and that cultural variation in
these ratings is limited.
Correlations between shame and guilt
For all three samples, mean scores were calculated for the ratings of the 41
emotion characteristics on shame and on guilt. Subsequently, bivariate
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correlations were calculated between shame and guilt ratings across the 41
characteristics. No significant correlation was found with the Mexican sample (r
-.02, ns) and a positive correlation was found for both the Indonesian sample (r
-.39, p ~ .OS) and the Dutch sample (r - .33, p ~.OS).
Table 1
Repeated Measures ANO ~A wrth Culture (2) as Between-Subjects Factor,
and Emotion (2j and Item (41) as Within-Subjects Factors
Source df F ~z
Between-subjects
Culture (C) 2 6.52~`~ .OS
Error (C) 241 (47.56)
W ithin-subjects
Emotion (E) 1 4.56~` .02
ExC 2 2.94 .02
Error (E) 241 (12.66)
[tem Q) 40 68.41 ~`~` .21
[ x C 80 7.17~`~` .04
Error ([) 9640 (2.74)
E x I 40 56.18~`~` .19
Ex1xC 80 2.42~~ .02
Error (E x I) 9640 (1.87)
Note. Values in parentheses are mean square errors.
~`p ~ .05. ~` ~`p ~ .01.
Distinct characteristics of shame and guilt
For each participant difference scores~ (difn were calculated between the ratings
of emotion characteristics for shame and for guilt. This resulted in a single
difference score for each emotion characteristic, indicating whether it was rated
higher for shame (positive dff) or for guilt (negative diff}. Difference scores can
be interpreted similarly to Cohen's d(Cohen, 1988): a score with an absolute
value of .20 indicates a small difference, of .50 a medium difference, and of .80
a large difference. Table 2 shows for each sample the average difference scores
for each emotion characteristic, ordered according to the size of these scores in
the Indonesian sample.
,
~1fieTenCe diYt -(X,,~131~~~-X-~ili~~~~~6shame~~6guilt -Z~r~shame,guilt)~6shame~6guilt~~ where X ÍS t}le
SCOre On an 2moilOn CilaraC[eCISIII'.
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Table 2
Mean Difference Scores per Emotion Characteristic.for Three Cultures~
Predicted
Emotion characteristic association` Indonesia Mexico Netherlands
Blushing shame .91 .42 .39
Smile shame .89 1.13 .95
Avoiding gaze shame .74 .78 .81
Center of attention shame .67 .84 1.1 1
Hiding shame .52 .69 .80
Powerless and small shame -21 .21 .46
Confused shame .17 .21 .24
Weak limbs shame .12 .63 .58
Feeling warm shame .OS .08 .12
Avoiding others knowing shame .04 .18 .28
Heart beating faster shame .03 .58 .29
Trembling shame -.Ol .00 .08
Feeling cold guilt -.02 .13 -.04
Trying to forget shame -.03 -.19 -.04
Sweating shame -.OS .33 .24
Angry with others shame -.06 .38 .19
Weak person shame -.10 .09 .13
Lump in the throat guilt -.l 3 -.10 .27
Isolated shame -.14 -.00 .50
Lost control shame -.17 .21 .08
Harms reputation shame -.17 -.08 -. I S
Ruminating guilt -.17 .18 .43
Talk to others guilt -.21 -.07 -.10
Getting pale guilt -.24 .24 -.07
Unexpected shame -.26 -.19 -.38
Explaining guilt -.27 .16 .O1
Personal expectations guilt -.30 -.27 -.13
Changing behavior guilt -.36 -.28 -.26
Disappointed with self guilt -.37 -.47 -.14

















association' Indonesia Mexico Netherlands
guilt -.43 -.68 -.65
guilt -.48 -.48 -.29
guilt -.52 -.48 -.30
guilt -.55 -.61 -.83
guilt -.58 -.86 -.41
guilt -.58 -. ] 9 -.30
guilt -.60 -.57 -.46
guilt -.60 -.39 -.20
guilt -.66 -.48 -.49
guilt -.92 -.60 -.61
guilt -1.04 -1.10 -1.19
~ Scores higher than zero indicate higher ratings for shame than for guilt, and scores lower than
zero indicate higher ratings for guilt than for shame.
'` For items predicted to be associated with shame a positive difference score was expected, and
for items predicted to be associated with guil[ a negative difference score was expected.
Agreement between samples in average difference scores is substantial:
bivariate correlations between samples range between . 89 and .93. Of the 41
emotion characteristics, 34 are associated with either shame or with guilt in the
way that was predicted in all samples. One characteristic (feeling colc~ was
rated in all samples higher for shame, rather than for guilt, contrary to the
hypothesis. For the remaining 6 emotion characteristics (150~0) the sign of the
average difference score is not the same in all samples.
Multidimensional scaling of emotion characteristics
For each sample, Euclidean distances between emotion characteristics were
computed using Multidimensional Scaling (Proxscal in SPSS I 1.5), based on
the difference scores matrices of participants by emotion characteristics. A
unidimensional representation accounted for .90 of the dispersion for the
Indonesians, .92 for the Mexicans, and .91 for the Dutch.
The individual sample representations were then compared using a
Generalized Procrustes Analysis (GPA, Commandeur, 1996). GPA calculates a
centroid configuration of the three samples representations through
transformations that leave the relative distances between items intact (see
Fontaine et al. 2003). The resulting centroid configuration could account for
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900~0 of the squared distances in the three sample representations. Inspection of
fit at item level showed that for 9 items the centroid accounted for less than
60o~0 of the squared distances. In a subsequent GPA these items were treated as
culture-specific items. This means that they were not included in the calculation
of the Iit of the centroid configuration, but that their position within this
configuration could be determined on the basis of the other items.
The GPA on the 32 culturally similar items produced a centroid
configuration that could account for 940~0 of the squared distances, indicating a
very good tit. This contiguration is depicted in Figure 1, with items plotted
along a single (guilt-shame) dimension. Because of the transformation of
difference scores into dissimilarity measures and subsequent GPA, the scale
values have no direct meaning; important are the relative distances between the
items, representing the degree to which these are related (exact positions and
proportions of squared distances accounted for can be found in Table A 1).
In Figure 2, culturally different items are depicted for each sample on the
cross-culturally shared guilt-shame dimension of Figure 1. Items have been.
ordered according to the magnitude of cross-cultural differences. For each item
the mean was taken of the absolute distances between pairs of samples (for all
items exact positions and mean absolute distances can be found in Table A2).
Congruence with Chapter 3
The centroid configuration obtained in the present study shared 29 items with
the centroid configuration reported in Chapter 3. GPA of the two configurations
resulted in a centroid that could account for 940~0 of the squared distances,
indicating a very good fit of MDS representations across studies.
Discussion
This study assessed cross-cultural similarities and differences in ratings of
emotion characteristics for self-reported experiences of shame and guilt. The
results were compared with findings of Chapter 3 in which preselected emotion
situations were rated. It was tested whether more cross-cultural variation would
be found with ratings of self-reported situations than with ratings of preselected
situations No evidence was found that this was the case.
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having done damage to someone
apologizing
deserving to be punished
being responsible for what happened
repairing
violating a moral or social norm
being a bad person
failing the expectations of others
others will disapprove





change behavior in the future
failing one's own expectations












smiling about what happened
avoiding the gaze of others
being the center of attention
blushing
Figure 1














what happened was unexpected
being isolated from others
having lost control over the situation
what happened will harm one's reputation
feeling a lump in the throat
getting pale
ruminating about what happened
talk to others about what happened
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(NON)EQUIVALENCE IN EXPERIENCES OF SHAME AND GUILT
Appendix
Table A1
Positions and Proportion of Distances Explained of Items




Done damage -0.319 .99
Apologizing -0.250 .99
Deserving punishment -0.206 .98
Being responsible -0.201 .98
Repairing -0. I 97 .94
Violating norm -0.182 .99
Bad person -0.160 .95
Expectations others -0.149 .94
Others disapprove -0.147 .97
Explaining -0.139 .87
Improving self -0.121 .96
Disappointed with self -0.1 10 .99
Angry with self -0.106 .94
Punishing self -0.106 .97
Changing behavior -0.104 .99
Personal expectations -0.091 .96
Avoiding others from knowing 0.050 .92
Feeling cold shivers 0.054 .90
Weak limbs 0.060 .77
Angry with others 0.069 .79
Trembling 0.080 .95
Heart beating faster 0.086 .87
Trying to forget 0.089 .97
Powerless and small 0.1 12 .92








Feeling warm 0.167 .97
Hiding 0.214 .98
Smiling 0.254 .95
Avoiding gaze 0.256 1.00
Center of attention 0.293 1.00
Blushing 0.319 .99
Table A2
Positions and Mean Absohrte Distances of Culturally Different Items on a




Indonesia Mexico Netherlands Distance
Unexpected 0.05 -0,12 0.01 0.1 1
Isolated -0.02 0.04 -0.12 0.11
Lost control 0.02 0.02 -0.12 0.10
Harms reputation 0.04 -0.01 -0.08 0.08
Lump in the throat -0.07 0.04 0.01 0.07
Getting pale 0.05 -0.05 -0.03 0.06
Ruminating -0.01 0.03 0.04 0.04
Talk to others 0.05 -0.01 0.04 0.03




The studies in this thesis attempt to contribute to our understanding of cultural
variation in emotions through culture-comparative studies including various
emotion components. A research strategy was followed aiming at the empirical
identification of cross-cultural equivalence in emotions ( see Fontaine,
Poortinga, Setiadi, 8r Markam, 2002), and using multiple emotion components
as indicators. This strategy produced findings of structural equivalence in
various emotion characteristics. Cross-cultural similarities were found in the
association of body sensations with seven emotions (Chapter 2), and of a range
of emotion components with shame and guilt (Chapters 3 to 5). In addition,
analyses in Chapters 2, 3, and 5 also suggested limited cultural variation in
quantitative comparisons, as reflected in the relatively small effect sizes
regarding cultural differences (see Scherer 8c Wallbott, 1994). it seems difficult
to dismiss these findings as due to impositions of Western views of emotion in
so far as stimulus situations were collected in the target cultures, and cross-
cultural similarities and differences in emotion components were established by
comparing within-culture constellations of findings.
The most important finding of Chapter 2 is that patterns of body sensations
associated with emotions were, by and large, also found with rural, non student
samples ( i.e., Rarámuri Indians and Javanese). This implies that in discussions
about the nature of body sensations with emotions, strict cultural-constructivist
accounts are not plausible. In addition, the interpretation of culturally different
body sensations against the background of common profiles gave a detailed
picture of where differences could be found.
In Chapter 3 substantial cross-cultural similarity was reported in the
association of different emotion components with either shame or guilt. This
finding makes basic differences in shame and guilt unlikely, even in widely
divergent cultures. Hence, discussions about cross-cultural differences in shame
and guilt should not so much address issues of cross-cultural identity of the
emotion constructs, but rather focus on how shame and guilt function in
different cultural contexts.
The most important finding of Chapter 4 is that distinctions between the
emotions of shame and guilt can be found even in a culture that does not
lexically distinguish between these emotions. This strongly suggests that there
does not need to be a one-to-one match between emotion processes and emotion
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words. In addition, this finding supports structural equivalence across cultures
of a core of emotion components associated with shame or guilt in Chapter 3,
and extends this finding to populations for which substantial cultural variation
in these emotions can be expected.
Finally Chapter 5 shows that cross-cultural similarities that were found in
Chapters 3 and 4 are not a consequence of any imposition of preselected shame
and guilt situations. Ratings of emotion components for self-reported
experiences of shame and guilt distinguished between these emotions in a
similar fashion as ratings of preselected shame and guilt situations in Chapter 3.
This suggests that the distinction between shame and guilt is robust across
different methods.
The ultimate goal of cross-cultural studies of emotions is to explain why
and where cultural context makes a difference in emotions. Currently popular
theories about general cross-cultural differences in psychological processes,
notably individualism and collectivism (Hofstede, 1980) tend to focus on global
differences and appear to lack the precision that is needed for such explanations.
In this thesis no evidence was found that differences in emotion components
and emotion-related terms between samples could be explained by a distinction
between individualist and collectivist societies. An observed difference between
Indonesian and Dutch students in the correlation of shame and guilt did not
replicate, and no systematic differences were found between Dutch and Belgian
samples and samples from Indonesia and Mexico in ratings of emotion words
and emotion components. The construction of more precise theories depends on
a body of empirical findings that provide at least a tentative indication of the
level and extent of cultural variation in emotion processes. In other words, we
first need to know what is different in emotions across cultures before theories
about such differences can be drafted.
Although a single series of studies as presented in this thesis cannot provide
any definite answers regarding the extent and level of cultural variation in
emotions, the results do narrow down the range of plausible positions in the
universalism - relativism debate. Most important, the evidence for structural
equivalence in shame and guilt (in terms of associated emotion components)
across a wide range of cultural samples makes it very unlikely that these
emotions differ to such an extent across cultures that they are incomparable.
Hence, the data presented in this thesis make claims of strong cultural relativism
in the emotions implausible. On the other hand, specific cross-cultural
differences that were found in the association of emotion components with
shame and guilt indicate that universality of emotions does not imply strict
invariance of psychological processes across cultures. For example, the body
sensation of blushing does not appear to be a universal indicator of shame, even
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though the association is very strong in Western conceptions of shame (Casimir
R Schnegg, 2002; Drummond, 2000; Simon 8t Shields, 1996). In addition,
specific appraisals (e.g., unexpectedness), self-experiences (e.g., feeling
powerless und smaln, and action tendencies (e.g., changing one's behavior in
the future) appear to be related differently to shame and guilt across cultures.
The results of the studies are in line with the perspective of psychological
universalism that was described in the introduction of this thesis (Berry,
Poortinga, Segall, 8c Dasen, 2002; Poortinga óc Soudijn, 2002). Even in studies
designed to maximize the probability of finding cross-cultural differences,
structural equivalence of emotion components of shame and guilt was found to
be the rule rather than the exception. This strongly suggests that there is basic
identity across cultures of emotion processes of shame and of guilt. This view is
not at variance with approaches that focus more on cultural differences in
emotions, but it does call for a qualification of the interpretation of such
differences. For example, Menon and Shweder's (1994) tinding that lajja
(shame) has a culture-specitic meaning in Orissa, India, does not necessarily
mean that this emotion is not comparable with experiences of shame in other
cultures (see Shweder 8z Haidt, 2000). Though specitic expressions or
experiences may be related differently with shame (or guilt) across cultures,
other components can still be cross-culturally similar (Mesquita, Frijda, 8z
Scherer, 1997).
Cross-cultural differences can also be found in salient values or concerns
that are associated with a specific emotion. For example, Rodriguez Mosquera,
Manstead, and Fischer (2002) found that concerns of family honor lead to
stronger reactions of shame in Spanish than in Dutch participants. This finding
suggests that more cross-cultural differences in shame will be found in
situations in which family honor is salient, but also implies as a condition for
meaningful comparison that the emotion of shame is structurally equivalent
across cultures. These examples support the position taken in this thesis that the
simultaneous study of cross-cultural similarities and differences in emotions is
necessary to provide a more detailed body of evidence on cultural variation in
the emotions. Any study of what is different between cultures in emotions in
some way or another also has to be a study of what is similar.
A main objective of this thesis was to extend quasi-experimental research
on emotions to non-Western and non-student samples, in order to make a more
accurate assessment of the extent of cross-cultural variation. The most salient
realization of this objective was the study of shame and guilt with the Rarámuri,
who lack a term for guilt. A focus on finding cross-cultural equivalence in a
range of emotion components enabled a comparison of emotional reactions in
this sample with student samples who did distinguish lexically between shame
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and guilt. The success of this study supports the assertion by Frijda, Markam,
Sato, and W iers (1995 ) that characteristic emotion components can be used to
study emotion processes across cultures, even when the emotion lexicon differs.
Thus, multicomponential theories of emotion do not only allow for a more
detailed investigation of cross-cultural similarities and differences (see
Mesquita et al., 1997), but also enable the study of emotion processes
independent of specific emotion words that are prominent in much of the cross-
cultural literature.
In Chapter 1 it was argued that issues of equivalence are a central concern
for culture-comparative research. The main emphasis in the studies reported has
been on structural equivalence: on the cross-cultural identity of emotion
constructs in terms of associated emotion components. It has to be noted that the
design of these studies did not permit an inquiry of bias at the level of separate
items. This implies that findings of culture specitícity could not be
differentiated with any precision from item bias, although inspection of cultural
differences against the background of similarities did provide tentative
suggestions for interpretation. The clearest example is the study on body
sensations reported in Chapter 2. Three possible types of differences have been
distinguished on the basis of association patterns across cultures and emotions:
(i) differences due to a general association of a body sensation with emotions
(e.g., weak in the knees with the Rarámuri), (ii) differences due to a general
absence of a body sensation with emotions (e.g., lump in the throat with the
Rarámuri), and (iii) differences due to a specific association of a body sensation
with an emotion (e.g., goose-flesh and fear. with the Javanese). In future studies
a more detailed investigation of observed differences should enable a tiner
differentiation between bias and real cross-cultural differences. Such studies
should be a major step towards identifying more precisely where and how
cultural variation affects emotions.
For the Rarámuri and the Javanese, correlations between emotion
characteristics could best be represented in a two-dimensional space defined by
a primary shame-guilt dimension, and a secondary internal-external dimension.
In contrast, in both chapters (3 and 5) describing student studies, emotion
characteristics could be adequately represented in a unidimensional space. At
the same time, a two-dimensional representation showed that the second
dimension with the students was very similar to that with the Rarámuri and
Javanese (Chapter 4). A study by Fontaine et al. (2003) with students from
Belgium and Peru also used two dimensions to represent shame and guilt
characteristics. The tïrst dimension, distinguishing between guilt and shame,
accounted for most of the dispersion in all samples.
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Still, the question needs to be addressed whether the findings are a
consequence of bias or of a stronger link between these social emotions and
interpersonal orientation with the Rarámuri and Javanese. Bias may be caused
by the type of situations that were used as stimuli with the Rarámuri or with the
Javanese, or by the procedure of gathering data by means of an interview, which
may have primed interpersonal concerns. If in future research the currently
observed cross-cultural differences would be replicated while bias can be ruled
out, then the present results suggest that the characteristics of shame and guilt
are not equally related in all cultures to intrapersonal andlor interpersonal
orientations (see Baumeister, 1994, 2001; Koentjaringrat, 1985).
Finally, the basic structural similarities between emotions found in the
present thesis rnay explain why people from different cultures can understand
each other even in the face of widely different customs and habits. For the
studies in this thesis, I had the privilege of visiting both Indonesia and Mexico.
One night, when I was on Java watching television with my host family, I had
the confusing experience of watching a Mexican soap, dubbed in the Indonesian
language. I asked my hosts if they did not think that the narrative and the rather
turbulent emotional lives of the protagonists were somewhat odd. They agreed
that it was different from what they were used to, but said it was entertaining to
watch anyway. The approach to cross-cultural differences presented in this
thesis should make it better understandable how it is possible that there can be
cultural differences in the emotion vocabulary and in emotional reactions to
specific events, but at the same time sufficient cross-cultural similarities in
emotional experiences for Indonesian viewers to enjoy Mexican soap-operas.
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Summary
Issues of cross-cultural variation in emotions have been prominent in
psychology for more than a century. However, theories and measures of culture
and emotion tend to vary substantially from one study to another. In addition,
discussions about cross-cultural (non)equivalence in emotions are often
characterized by a dichotomy between positions of pan-cultural universalism
and cultural relativism. The studies in this thesis attempt to contribute to our
understanding of cultural variation in emotions, especially shame and guilt, by
showing how emotions can have at the same time universally shared and
culturally variable components.
Chapter 1 identified several problems in the cross-cultural study of emotions. It
was noted that psychologists like to focus on cultural variation in emotions, but
that the interpretation of such variation is hampered by the quasi-experimental
design of cross-cultural studies, the likelihood of bias in the data, and the
absence of well-defined theories of cultural variation in emotions. The logic of
testing for cultural differences in emotions requires that emotions are to some
extent equivalent across cultures; any meaningful comparison becomes
impossible when emotions are fundamentally different between cultures. Three
levels of equivalence were distinguished: structural equivalence, metric
equivalence, and full-score equivalence. The lowest level, structural
equivalence, implies that the same construct (e.g., the emotions shame or guilt)
is measured across cultures, but not necessarily on the same quantitative scale.
This is a minimal condition for any cross-cultural comparison. The studies in
this thesis assessed cultural variation at different levels of equivalence, with
emphasis on structural (non)equivalence of emotion constructs across cultures.
Chapter 1 also described how recent developments of componential emotion
theories offer a basis for comparing emotions across cultures without relying on
single measures, such as emotion words. This is especially important for the
study of the social emotions, such as shame and guilt, that can not be
distinguished on the basis of (observable) facial expressions like the basic
emotions. Although reports of cross-cultural differences in shame and guilt have
a long history, the extent to which these emotions are equivalent is still unclear.
Chapter 1 further described the research strategy followed in this thesis. Various
emotion components were studied to assess cross-cultural equivalence in
emotions, especially shame and guilt, in samples from a broad range of cultural
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backgrounds. This included students from Belgium, Indonesia, Mexico, and the
Netherlands, but also non-student Rarámuri Indians and rural Javanese. The
thesis departed from a perspective of psychological universalism, which means
that basic emotion processes were expected to be found across cultures, but that
there could be differences in the culttu~al manifestations.
Chapter 2 focused on body sensations associated with seven emotions: joy,
anger, fear, sadness, disgust, surprise, and shame. Findings of cross-cultural
similarities in previous studies have been disputed by scholars who argue that
studies with non-student samples from non-western countries yield more
cultural variation than had been previously found. The study in chapter 2 tested
this claim by including Rarámuri Indians from northern Mexico and rural
Javanese from Indonesia with low exposure to western culture, in addition to
student samples from three continents. Cultural variation was found in the data,
but to a limited extent. Patterns of body sensations associated with emotions
were, by and large, replicated with the non-student samples. Some salient
cultural differences were identified against the background of the cross-
culturally shared patterns. Although the non-student samples did contribute
more to the cultural variation than the student samples, it was concluded that a
core of body sensations is associated with emotions in a similar way across
cultures.
Chapter 3 presented two studies that assessed cross-cultural similarities and
differences in the emotions shame and guilt, at different levels of equivalence.
Many claims have been made in the literature about (non)equivalence of shame
and guilt across cultures, but it is not clear to what extent these emotions are
similar or different. In the first study, students from Indonesia and the
Netherlands rated a large set of situations on the extent to which these would
elicit shame and guilt, next to anger, fear, and sadness. Ratings of shame and
guilt were found to be largely equivalent between both samples at a structural
level, but differences were found in the correlation of both emotions (i.e., shame
and guilt were positively correlated in the Netherlands but not in Indonesia). In
the second study, students from Belgium, Indonesia, Mexico, and the
Netherlands, rated 15 strong shame-eliciting and~or guilt-eliciting situations on
47 emotion characteristics (including appraisals, action tendencies, body
sensations, emotion words, self-experiences, rumination and social sharing) that
were selected from the literature as typical for either experiences of shame or
experiences of guilt. The correlations of ratings of shame and of guilt with
ratings of the emotion characteristics showed substantial similarity among all
samples. Most emotion characteristics were associated with either shame or
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guilt in the predicted way in all samples. The correlations among all emotion
characteristics could be represented on a single dimension (using
Multidimensional Scaling), representing a clear shame-guilt distinction. The
positions of 35 emotion characteristics on this dimension were found to be
similar in all four samples, whereas with 12 characteristics some cultural
differences were found. Correlations between ratings of shame and guilt were
not signitícant in any sample. Some differences in intensity ratings were found
with the Indonesians, who tended to rate guilt more intensely than the other
samples. Over-all, the studies in chapter 3 suggested substantial structural
equivalence in shame and guilt among cultures, both in ratings of these
emotions across situations and in the association of these emotions with various
emotion characteristics.
Chapter 4 extended the assessment of structural equivalence in shame and guilt
to Rarámuri Indians, who lack an emotion term for guilt, and to rural Javanese
from Indonesia. Two studies addressed the question to what extent the findings
obtained with student samples in chapter 3 could be generalized to non-student
samples, including a culture that lacks a lexical distinction between shame and
guilt. In the first study a range of descriptions of daily episodes eliciting shame
were collected from the Rarámuri, and descriptions of episodes eliciting shame
or eliciting guilt were collected from the Javanese. These episodes were rated
by Dutch and Indonesian students on the extent to which they would elicit
shame and guilt. It was found that 340~0 of the Rarámuri shame episodes were
rated by the students higher on guilt than on shame. In contrast, 820~0 of the
Javanese shame episodes were rated by the students higher on shame than on
guilt, and 750~0 of the guilt episodes were rated higher on guilt than on shame.
This suggested that Rarámuri shame may encompass both experiences of, what
would be labeled in English, emotions of shame and guilt. In the second study
Rarámuri and Javanese samples rated 18 strong shame-eliciting andlor guilt-
eliciting situations on 29 emotion characteristics (including appraisals, action
tendencies, body sensations, shame, guilt [Javanese only], self-experiences, and
rumination) that were selected from the literature as typical for either
experiences of shame or experiences of guilt. For each sample, the correlations
among all emotion characteristics were represented in a two-dimensional space
(using Multidimensional Scaling), showing a shame-guilt distinction, and an
internal-external distinction. Comparison of the Javanese contíguration with a
two-dimensional configuration of 29 emotion characteristics calculated on the
student data in chapter 3(study 2), showed similar positions for 22 emotion
characteristics, and cultural differences for 7 characteristics. Comparison of the
Rarámuri configuration (including 28 characteristics, because an emotion word
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for guilt was lacking) with the student configuration showed similar positions
for 19 emotion characteristics, and cultural differences for 9 characteristics. A
clear distinction was found between emotion characteristics associated with
shame, and emotion characteristics associated with guilt, even with the
Rarámuri who lacked an emotion term for guilt. Some emotion characteristics
were found to be associated differently with shame and guilt with both the
Rarámuri and the Javanese when compared to the students. This suggests that
some characteristics of shame and guilt in the current emotion literature may not
be universal. Over-all, the studies in chapter 4 supported a position of
psychological universalism regarding shame and guilt. A core of shame and
guilt characteristics could be found in all samples, even when a term for an
emotion was absent.
Chapter 5 assessed cross-cultural equivalence of shame and guilt in ratings of
selt-reported experiences, rather than preselected situations as was done in
chapters 3 and 4. This was to ascertain that the cross-cultural similarities found
in both preceding chapters were not due to an imposition of the stimulus
situations. Students from Indonesia, Mexico, and the Netherlands, rated self-
reported experiences of shame and of guilt on 41 emotion characteristics
(including appraisals, action tendencies, body sensations, self-experiences,
rumination and social sharing). Differences in ratings of emotion characteristics
between shame and guilt experiences showed substantial similarity among all
samples. A unidimensional contiguration of the difference scores showed a
clear shame-guilt distinction that was very similar to the configuration found in
chapter 3. This suggested that a cross-culturally similar distinction between
shame and guilt characteristics can be found using different methods.
Finally, chapter 6 recapitulated the main findings of the preceding chapters. It
was concluded that the research strategy followed in this thesis was successful
in producing evidence for structural equivalence in various emotion
characteristics. This finding narrows down the range of plausible positions in
the universalism-relativism debate. On the one hand, claims of strong cultural
relativism in emotions become implausible in view of the structural equivalence
that was found. On the other hand, the cultural differences in emotion
characteristics that were found indicate that universality of emotions does not
imply strict invariance of psychological processes across cultures. All in all, the
results of the studies described in this thesis appear to support the position of
psychological universalism that was outlined in the tirst chapter.
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Culturele verschillen in emoties zijn al meer dan een eeuw een belangrijk
onderwerp in de psychologie. Theorieën en metingen met betrekking tot cultuur
en emoties zijn echter zeer verschillend van de ene studie op de andere.
Daarnaast worden discussies over cross-culturele (on)gelijkheid van emoties
vaak gekenmerkt door een dichotomie tussen posities van pan-cultureel
universalisme enerzijds en cultureel relativisme anderzijds. De studies in dit
proefschrift proberen een bijdrage te leveren aan ons begrip van culturele
variatie in emoties, met name schaamte en schuld, door te laten zien hoe
emoties zowel universeel gedeelde als cultureel variabele kenmerken kunnen
hebben.
In hoofdstuk 1 werd een aantal problemen in het cross-culturele
emotieonderzoek besproken. Er werd geconstateerd dat psychologen zich bij
voorkeur richten op culturele variatie in emoties, maar dat de interpretatie van
deze variatie bemoeilijkt wordt door het quasi-experimentele design van cross-
culturele studies, door het voorkomen van bevooroordeeldheid in de data, en
door de afwezigheid van eenduidige theorieën over culturele verschillen in
emoties. De logica van het testen van culturele verschillen veronderstelt dat
emoties tot op zekere hoogte equivalent zijn tussen culturen; elke zinvolle
vergelijking wordt onmogelijk wanneer emoties fundamenteel verschillend zijn
tussen culturen. Er werden drie niveaus van equivalentie onderscheiden:
structurele equivalentie, metrische equivalentie, en schaal equivalentie. Op het
laagste niveau, structurele equivalentie, wordt hetzelfde construct (bijv. de
emotie schaamte ofschulc~ gemeten tussen culturen, maar niet noodzakelijk op
dezelfde kwantitatieve schaal. Dit is een minimale voorwaarde voor elke cross-
culturele vergelijking. De studies in dit proefschrift bestudeerden culturele
variatie op verschillende niveaus van equivalentie, met de nadruk op structurele
(in)equivalentie van emotieconstructen tussen culturen. In hoofdstuk 1 werd ook
beschreven hoe recente ontwikkelingen van componentiële emotietheorieën de
mogelijkheid bieden om emoties te vergelijken tussen culturen zonder
afhankelijk te zijn van enkelvoudige metingen, zoals emotiewoorden. Dit is bij
uitstek belangrijk voor het bestuderen van sociale emoties als schaamte en
schuld, omdat deze niet onderscheiden kunnen worden op basis van
(observeerbare) gelaatsexpressies zoals de basisemoties. Hoewel beweringen
over cross-culturele verschillen in schaamte en schuld een lange geschiedenis
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kennen is het nog onduidelijk in hoeverre deze emoties equivalent zijn. Verder
werd ín hoofdstuk l beschreven welke onderzoeksstrategie gevolgd werd in dit
proefschrift. Verschillende emotiecomponenten zijn gebruikt om de cross-
culturele equivalentie van emoties, met name schaamte en schuld, te bestuderen.
Dit is gedaan in steekproeven van uiteenlopende culturele achtergrond,
waaronder studenten uit België, [ndonesië, Mexico, en Nederland, alsmede
Rarámuri Indianen en rurale Javanen. Het uitgangspunt van dit proefschrifit was
een perspectief van psychologisch universalisme. Dit betekent dat er verwacht
werd dat basale emotieprocessen in alle culturen gevonden zouden worden,
maar ook dat er culturele verschillen kunnen bestaan in de manier waarop deze
processen tot uiting komen.
Hoofdstuk 2 richtte zich op lichaamsgewaarwordingen geassocieerd met zeven
emoties: blijdschap, boosheid, angst, droefheid, walging, verassing, en
schaamte. Bevindingen van cross-culturele overeenkomsten in eerdere studies
worden betwíst door onderzoekers die verwachten dat studies met niet-
studenten uit niet-westerse landen veel meer culturele verschillen zullen
opleveren. De studie in hoofdstuk 2 testte deze verwachting door het bestuderen
van Rarámuri Indianen uit Noord-Mexico en Javanen uit Indonesië met weinig
blootstelling aan de westerse cultuur, naast studenten afkomstig uit drie
continenten. Er werden culturele verschillen gevonden in de data, maar slechts
tot op beperkte hoogte. Patronen van lichaamsgewaarwordingen geassocieerd
met emoties werden over het algemeen ook gevonden bij de twee niet-student
groepen. Hoewel de niet-student groepen meer bijdroegen aan de culturele
variatie dan de studenten, kon geconcludeerd worden dat een kern van
lichaamsgewaarwordingen op eenzelfde wijze geassocieerd is met emoties in
verschillende culturen.
In hoofdstuk 3 werden twee studies gepresenteerd naar cross-culturele
overeenkomsten en verschillen in de emoties schaamte en schuld, op
verschillende niveaus van equivalentie. In de literatuur zijn veel claims te
vinden over de vermeende (in)equivalentie van schaamte en schuld, maar het is
nog onduidelijk tot op welke hoogte deze emoties overeenkomstig of
verschillend zijn. In de eerste studie beoordeelden studenten uit Indonesië en
Nederland een omvangrijke set van situaties op de wijze waarop deze bij hen
gevoelens van schaamte en schuld zouden opwekken, naast gevoelens van
boosheid, angst, en droefheid. Beoordelingen van schaamte en schuld bleken
grotendeels equivalent tussen de twee groepen op een structureel niveau, maar
er werden verschillen gevonden in de mate waarop deze twee emoties
correleerden (schaamte en schuld waren positief gecorreleerd in Nederland
132
SAMFNVATTING
maar niet in Indonesië). In de tweede studie beoordeelde studenten uit België,
Indonesië, Mexico, en Nederland 15 sterke schaamte-opwekkende en~of schuld-
opwekkende situaties op 47 emotiekarakteristieken (waaronder evaluaties,
actietendensen, lichaamsgewaarwordingen, emotiewoorden, zelf-ervaringen,
piekeren en sociaal delen), die in de emotieliteratuur genoemd werden als
typisch voor ofwel ervaringen van schaamte ofwel ervaringen van schuld. De
correlaties van de beoordelingen van schaamte en van schuld met de
beoordelingen van de andere emotiekarakteristieken vertoonden grote gelijkenis
tussen de culturen. De meeste emotiekarakteristieken waren op de verwachte
wijze geassocieerd met ofwel schaamte ofwel schuld in alle culturen. De
correlaties tussen alle karakteristieken konden worden weergegeven op één
enkele dimensie (door middel van Multidimensional Scaling), die een
onderscheid maakte tussen schaamte en schuld. De posities van 35
emotiekarakteristieken op deze dimensie was hetzelfde in alle vier culturen,
terwijl bij 12 karakteristieken culturele verschillen werden gevonden. De
correlaties tussen beoordelingen van schaamte en schuld waren in geen enkele
cultuur significant. Culturele verschillen in de intensiteit van de beoordelingen
werden gevonden bij de Indonesiërs, die ernaar neigden meer schuld te
rapporteren dan de andere culturen. Samenvattend kan gesteld worden dat de
studies in hoofdstuk 3 substantiële structurele equivalentie suggereerden tussen
culturen in schaamte en schuld, zowel in beoordeling van deze emoties over
situaties als in de associatie van deze emoties met verschillende
emotiekarakteristieken.
In hoofdstuk 4 werd het onderzoek naar structurele equivalentie in schaamte en
schuld uitgebreid met Rarámuri Indianen, die geen term voor de emotie schuld
kennen, en met Javanen uit Indonesië. In twee studies werd nagegaan in
hoeverre de bevindingen met studenten in hoofdstuk 3 veralgemeniseerd
konden worden naar niet-studenten, waaronder een cultuur waarin geen
woordelijk onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen schaamte en schuld. In de eerste
studie werden beschrijvingen verzameld van dagelijkse situaties die bij de
Rarámuri schaamte opwekten, en beschrijvingen van situaties die bij de Javanen
ofwel schaamte ofwel schuld opwekten. Deze situaties werden beoordeeld door
Indonesische en Nederlandse studenten op de mate waarin deze bij hen
schaamte en schuld zouden opwekken. Er werd gevonden dat 340~o van de
schaamte-situaties van de Rarámuri door de studenten werd beoordeeld als meer
schuld dan schaamte opwekkend. Daarentegen werd 820~o van de Javaanse
schaamte-situaties door de studenten beoordeeld als meer schaamte dan schuld
opwekkend, en 750~o van de Javaanse schuld-situaties als meer schuld dan
schaamte opwekkend. Dit suggereerde dat schaamte bij de Rarámuri zowel
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ervaringen omvat die in het Neder(ands schaamte genoemd zouden worden, als
ervaringen die schuld genoemd zouden worden. In de tweede studie
beoordeelden Rarámuri en Javanen 18 schaamte- of schuld-opwekkende
situaties op 29 emotiekarakteristieken (waaronder evaluaties, actietendensen,
lichaamsgewaarwordingen, schaamte, schuld [alleen bij de Javanen], zelf-
ervaringen, en piekeren), die in de literatuur genoemd werden als kenmerkend
voor ervaringen van schaamte of van schuld. Voor beide culturen werden de
correlaties tussen alle emotiekarakteristieken weergegeven in een twee-
dimensionele ruimte (door middel van Multidinensional Scaling), met een
onderscheid tussen schaamte en schuld op een dimensie en een onderscheid
tussen inteme en externe ervaringen op de andere dimensie. Vergelijking van de
Javaanse contiguratie met een twee-dimensionele configuratie van 29
emotiekarakteristieken berekend op de studentendata uit hoofdstuk 3(studie 2),
liet een gelijke positie zien voor 22 emotiekarakteristieken, terwijl culturele
verschillen werden gevonden voor 7 karakteristieken. Vergelijking van de
Rarámuri configuratie (met slechts 28 karakteristieken, omdat een emotiewoord
voor schuld ontbrak) met de studentenconfiguratie liet een gelijke positie zien
voor 19 karakteristieken, en culturele verschillen voor 9 karakteristieken. Een
helder onderscheid werd gevonden tussen emotiekarakteristieken geassocieerd
met schaamte en emotiekarakteristieken geassocieerd met schuld, zelfs bij de
Rarámuri die geen emotieterm voor schuld hebben. Sommige
emotiekarakteristieken waren anders geassocieerd met schaamte en schuld bij
de Rarámuri en de Javanen in vergelijking met de studenten. Dit suggereert dat
een aantal karakteristieken van schaamte en schuld die beschreven worden in de
huidige emotieliteratuur niet universeel zijn. Over het algemeen ondersteunden
de studies in hoofdstuk 4 een positie van psychologisch universalisme ten
aanzien van schaamte en schuld. Een kern van schaamte- en
schuldkarakteristieken werd gevonden in alle culturen, zelfs als een
emotiewoord afwezig was.
In hoofdstuk 5 werd cross-culturele equivalentie van schaamte en schuld
onderzocht in beoordelingen van zelf-gerapporteerde ervaringen, in plaats van
geselecteerde situaties zoals in hoofdstukken 3 en 4. Dit was om er zeker van te
zijn dat de cross-culturele overeenkomsten in beide voorafgaande hoofdstukken
niet veroorzaakt werd door de opgelegde stimulus situaties. Studenten uit
Indonesië, Mexico, en Nederland beoordeelden zelf-gerapporteerde ervaringen
van schaamte en van schuld op 41 emotiekarakteristieken (waaronder
evaluaties, actietendensen, lichaamsgewaarwordingen, zelf-ervaringen, piekeren
en sociaal delen). Verschillen in beoordelingen van de emotiekarakteristieken
voor de schaamte- en de schuldervaring vertoonden substantiële
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overeenkomsten tussen alle culturen. Een ééndimensionele configuratie van de
verschilscores vertoonde een duidelijk onderscheid tussen schaamte en schuld,
op eenzelfde wijze als de contíguratie in hoofdstuk 3. Dit suggereert dat
eenzelfde, cross-cultureel gedeeld onderscheid tussen schaamte- en
schuldkarakteristieken gevonden kan worden met behulp van verschillende
~inderzoeksmethoden.
Hoofdstuk 6, tenslotte, besprak de belangrijkste bevindingen van de voorgaande
hoofdstukken. Er werd geconcludeerd dat de onderzoeksstrategie die gevolgd
werd in dit proefschrift succesvol was in het vinden van evidentie voor
structurele equivalentie in verscheidene emotiekarakteristieken. Deze bevinding
beperkt de ruimte voor aannemelijke posities in het universalisme-relativisme
debat. Aan de ene kant worden sterke claims van culturele relativiteit van
emoties onaannemelijk in het licht van de gevonden structurele equivalentie.
Aan de andere kant geven de gevonden culturele verschillen in
emotiekarakteristieken aan dat universaliteit van emoties niet betekent dat deze
totaal hetzelfde zijn in alle culturen. Alles bij elkaar ondersteunen de resultaten
van de studies in dit proefschritt de positie van psychologisch universalisme ten
aanzien van emoties, zoals beschreven werd in het eerste hoofdstuk.
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The extent to which emotions are similar or different across cultures is an
important issue in the psychology ofemotions. This thesis aims to contribute to
our understanding of cross-cultural (non)equivalence in emotions, especially
shame and guilt, through a series of studies including various emotion
components. Studies include samples from a broad range of cultures, such as
students from three continents, Rarámuri Indians, and rural Javanese. A core
of emotion characteristics was found to be universally associated with either
shame or guilt, even in cultures lacking a lexical distinction between these two
emotions. In addition, several cultural differences in emotion characteristics
were identified.
